Blood And Oil Book Review

Michael T. Klare,
Blood and Oil: The Dangers and Consequences of America’s Growing Dependency on Imported Petroleum
(New York: Metropolitan Books/Henry Holt, 2004).
Preface
How to explain the post-Cold War violence? Some attribute it to identity politics (xi-xii).
Pace
Samuel Huntington, the cause is a struggle for resources (xii). Oil as special resource: 2001 and since revelatory of the consequences of oil dependency (xiii-xv). Goal of book: “Tracing the evolution of U.S. oil policy and weighing its consequences for the future” (xvi).
Ch. 1: The Dependency Dilemma: Imported Oil and National Security.
Cento (1-4). Military sees it as an extension of the 1980 Carter Doctrine (5-6).Similar development elsewhere of military as “global oil-protection service”
Involvement in development of Persian Gulf oil (35). Roosevelt and In Saud forge alliance, Feb. 14, 1945 (35-37). U.S.commitment to defend Saudi oil fields and the Saudi government ― and other Persian Gulf oil sources ― “a major theme of cold-war history” (37-38). Iran crisis of 1946 and concern for Mideast oil: need to overcome domestic resistance to overseas commitments led to “apocalyptic terms” of the Truman Doctrine (39-41). U.S. helps create modern Saudi army and air force, 1949-early 1950s (40). Eisenhower Doctrine (Jan. 5, 1957) designed to bolster pro-American regimes in the context of Nasser’s flirtation with the Soviet Union (41-42).Vietnam War forced proxy-based Nixon Doctrine (July 1969); Saudi Arabia and Iran are proxies of choice (42-43). But it inspired domestic opposition and leads to Shah’s overthrow in 1979 (44-45). Hostage drama and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan lead to Carter Doctrine (Jan. 23, 1980): the U.S. will protect Persian Gulf oil “by any means necessary” (45-46). Creation of Central Command (46-47). Consequences of the Carter Doctrine: huge arms sales to Saudi Arabia (47-48), tilting toward Iraq in Iran-Iraq war (48-49), ousting Iraq from Kuwait (49-50). Aug. 6, 1990 Cheney-King Fahd meeting leads to Operation Desert Shield (51-52).Desert Storm (52-53). Containment of Iraq: No-fly zones, $40b in arms to Saudi Arabia (53). 9/11 attacks and Osama bin Laden’s hostility “provoked primarily by the deployment of American
U.S. strategy aims atraising Persian Gulf oil production “from 24.0million barrels per day in 1999 to 44.5 millionbarrels in 2020” (79). Obstacles: economic,technological, political, and military (79-82).Strands of U.S. policy constitute a “strategyof maximum extraction” (82-84). Primaryimportance of Saudi Arabia led some toadvocate in 2002 for seizure of Saudi oilfields (84-86). Social, economic, political,and religious sources of Saudi instability (86-89). U.S. approach is to strengthen Saudiroyal family and encourage reform (89-90).Iraq war as a way of being able to withdrawU.S. troops from Saudi Arabia (90).Palestinian statehood also backed for thisreason (91). Likewise. calls for reform andfighting terrorism in Saudi Arabia (91-93).Overthrow of Saddam Hussein needed bothto foster Gulf stability and to boost Iraqiproduction (94-105). Iran’s policies are inopposition to U.S. plans in the Persian Gulf,and sanctions are an inadequate weaponbecause they impede development of petroleum resources (105-07). Iran also hasthe power to disrupt energy supplies byblocking the Strait of Hormuz (107-08). Forthe time being the “dual-track policy” of Zalmay Khalilzad, consisting of denouncingIran’s government while encouragingopponents of the regime is being followed,but more aggressive policies are beingconsidered (108-10). Gulf problems willcontinue to require U.S. troops: “No matterhow