Big Time Toymaker
RUNNING HEAD
Case Scenario: Big Time Toymaker
LaTanga Washington
Law/421
January 28, 2013
Dr. Thomas Wilson
Abstract
Big Time Toymaker a developer manufacturer and distributor of board games and toys recently collaborated with and an inventor named Chou. Chou invented a strategy game called Strat, which requires a distributor. Chou entered into an agreement with Big Time for $25.000 and in return, Chou granted Big Time the exclusive negotiation rights for 90 days. During that time, Big Time honored the agreement, but three days shy of the expiration date, a Big Time manager forwarded a drafted agreement via e-mail, which covered the terms of the agreement. Chou received and responded to the draft in agreement with the terms; however, Big Time did not respond and months later Big Time was no longer interested (Melvin, 2011).
The proposed contract existed immediately following the agreement to exclusive rights. The contract from that point was valid for 90 days following the agreement, which obstructed Chou’s ability to negotiate with other distribution outlets. The elements, which validate a contracts formation consist of an offer, BTT offered $25,000 to Chou for exclusive negotiation rights, acceptance Chou accepted the offer and monetary compensation, and finally the consideration for BTT exclusive negotiation rights to the game and Chou $25,000 (Melvin, 2011).
The Big Time Toymaker manager drafted an agreement before Chou took initiative; therefore, based on the manager’s initiative resulting in labeling the e-mail with Strat Deal, insertion of key terms, a distribution agreement with prices, times, and various obligations proved mutual assent ( Melvin, 2011). Even without the formal word contract, the e-mail set the tone for an agreement. No matter what e-mail is a valid source of communication; therefore, the impact of the choice of communication remains relevant because the transfer of communications constituted an extension of the
Case Scenario: Big Time Toymaker
LaTanga Washington
Law/421
January 28, 2013
Dr. Thomas Wilson
Abstract
Big Time Toymaker a developer manufacturer and distributor of board games and toys recently collaborated with and an inventor named Chou. Chou invented a strategy game called Strat, which requires a distributor. Chou entered into an agreement with Big Time for $25.000 and in return, Chou granted Big Time the exclusive negotiation rights for 90 days. During that time, Big Time honored the agreement, but three days shy of the expiration date, a Big Time manager forwarded a drafted agreement via e-mail, which covered the terms of the agreement. Chou received and responded to the draft in agreement with the terms; however, Big Time did not respond and months later Big Time was no longer interested (Melvin, 2011).
The proposed contract existed immediately following the agreement to exclusive rights. The contract from that point was valid for 90 days following the agreement, which obstructed Chou’s ability to negotiate with other distribution outlets. The elements, which validate a contracts formation consist of an offer, BTT offered $25,000 to Chou for exclusive negotiation rights, acceptance Chou accepted the offer and monetary compensation, and finally the consideration for BTT exclusive negotiation rights to the game and Chou $25,000 (Melvin, 2011).
The Big Time Toymaker manager drafted an agreement before Chou took initiative; therefore, based on the manager’s initiative resulting in labeling the e-mail with Strat Deal, insertion of key terms, a distribution agreement with prices, times, and various obligations proved mutual assent ( Melvin, 2011). Even without the formal word contract, the e-mail set the tone for an agreement. No matter what e-mail is a valid source of communication; therefore, the impact of the choice of communication remains relevant because the transfer of communications constituted an extension of the