Bertrand Russell's Theory of Perception
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Philosophy 2K
Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Perception, put forth in his book The Problems of Philosophy is focused around the theory of sense-data. This essay will outline Russell’s theory and present some of the arguments that support his view, such as the argument from hallucination. I will outline an attack on Russell’s theory and then move to present an alternative argument accounting for the relevant phenomena: the adverbial theory and show how Russell’s theory does more to convince one of the nature of our perception.
Russell’s theory of perception is rooted in his faith in sense-data. This is the notion that whatever we perceive are mind dependent objects whose existence and properties are known directly to us and about which we cannot be mistaken. Sense-data are representations of ‘real’ objects in the world outside the mind, of which we can be mistaken. For Russell and the sense-data theorist, what is being perceived depends greatly on the mind for its existence and that what we perceive is not a public physical object but a private, non-physical entity. He also believes that relying on the experiences of other people is question begging and therefore commits himself to finding;
‘…in our own purely private experiences, characteristics which show, or tend to show, that there are in the world things other than ourselves and our private experiences.’1
So, according to Russell, we can only have knowledge of external objects by being aware of the representations of objects that our sense-data gives us. However, it is important to note that according to sense-data, objects cannot exist unperceived. This is a form of indirect realism, and there are some arguments that support Russell’s theory.
There are three sub-arguments that fall under the broad term of the Argument from Illusion that support Russell’s assertion that sense-data is distinct from the physical object and that what we experience is not that of a public object. These
Philosophy 2K
Bertrand Russell’s Theory of Perception, put forth in his book The Problems of Philosophy is focused around the theory of sense-data. This essay will outline Russell’s theory and present some of the arguments that support his view, such as the argument from hallucination. I will outline an attack on Russell’s theory and then move to present an alternative argument accounting for the relevant phenomena: the adverbial theory and show how Russell’s theory does more to convince one of the nature of our perception.
Russell’s theory of perception is rooted in his faith in sense-data. This is the notion that whatever we perceive are mind dependent objects whose existence and properties are known directly to us and about which we cannot be mistaken. Sense-data are representations of ‘real’ objects in the world outside the mind, of which we can be mistaken. For Russell and the sense-data theorist, what is being perceived depends greatly on the mind for its existence and that what we perceive is not a public physical object but a private, non-physical entity. He also believes that relying on the experiences of other people is question begging and therefore commits himself to finding;
‘…in our own purely private experiences, characteristics which show, or tend to show, that there are in the world things other than ourselves and our private experiences.’1
So, according to Russell, we can only have knowledge of external objects by being aware of the representations of objects that our sense-data gives us. However, it is important to note that according to sense-data, objects cannot exist unperceived. This is a form of indirect realism, and there are some arguments that support Russell’s theory.
There are three sub-arguments that fall under the broad term of the Argument from Illusion that support Russell’s assertion that sense-data is distinct from the physical object and that what we experience is not that of a public object. These
Bibliography: Russell, B. The Problems of Philosophy (OUP 2001) Miah, S. Russell’s Theory of Perception (Dhaka University Press 1998) John Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (OUP 1964) Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Epistemological Problems of Perception, (published July 2001): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-episprob/ Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, The Problem of Perception, (published March 2005): http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/perception-problem/