Assignment
Transfer pricing, tax havens and global governance
Ganapati Bhat
Bonn 2009
Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ISSN 1860-0441
Bhat, Ganapati: Transfer pricing, tax havens and global governance / Ganapati Bhat. – Bonn : DIE, 2009. – Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ; 7/2009) ISBN 978-3-88985-455-1
Ganapati Bhat is an officer of the Indian Revenue Service, presently working in the Directorate of Transfer Pricing of the Government of India. His research interests are Multinational Corporations, Foreign Direct Investment and Transfer Pricing. E-mail: gr.bhat@yahoo.co.in
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn +49 (0)228 94927-0 +49 (0)228 94927-130 E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de http://www.die-gdi.de
This study has been prepared as part of the Managing Global Governance Programme, an initiative of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), implemented jointly by the German Development Institute (DIE) and Capacity Building International Germany (InWent) in 2008. The author would like to acknowledge with gratitude the valuable suggestions and guidance of Thomas Fues of DIE, Quentin Dupriez and Mike Pfister of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Nagesh Kumar of Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and Khan Masood of Jamia Milia Islamia. The author is also grateful to Manoranjan Hota, Sachin Chaturvedi, S.K. Mohanty and Ram Singh for their help and encouragement. The views expressed reflect the personal opinion of the author and cannot in any way be ascribed to the Income Tax Department of the Government of India or to other institutions and persons referred to above.
Foreword
Tax-motivated transfer pricing has attracted world attention owing to the existence of low-tax jurisdictions and the volume of the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs have many instruments
Ganapati Bhat
Bonn 2009
Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ISSN 1860-0441
Bhat, Ganapati: Transfer pricing, tax havens and global governance / Ganapati Bhat. – Bonn : DIE, 2009. – Discussion Paper / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik ; 7/2009) ISBN 978-3-88985-455-1
Ganapati Bhat is an officer of the Indian Revenue Service, presently working in the Directorate of Transfer Pricing of the Government of India. His research interests are Multinational Corporations, Foreign Direct Investment and Transfer Pricing. E-mail: gr.bhat@yahoo.co.in
© Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik gGmbH Tulpenfeld 6, 53113 Bonn +49 (0)228 94927-0 +49 (0)228 94927-130 E-Mail: die@die-gdi.de http://www.die-gdi.de
This study has been prepared as part of the Managing Global Governance Programme, an initiative of the German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), implemented jointly by the German Development Institute (DIE) and Capacity Building International Germany (InWent) in 2008. The author would like to acknowledge with gratitude the valuable suggestions and guidance of Thomas Fues of DIE, Quentin Dupriez and Mike Pfister of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), Nagesh Kumar of Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS) and Khan Masood of Jamia Milia Islamia. The author is also grateful to Manoranjan Hota, Sachin Chaturvedi, S.K. Mohanty and Ram Singh for their help and encouragement. The views expressed reflect the personal opinion of the author and cannot in any way be ascribed to the Income Tax Department of the Government of India or to other institutions and persons referred to above.
Foreword
Tax-motivated transfer pricing has attracted world attention owing to the existence of low-tax jurisdictions and the volume of the activities of multinational corporations (MNCs). MNCs have many instruments
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