Aristotle's Definition of Nature
Aristotle's Definition of Nature
Nature, in its essence, is the cause/effect relationship offered to things with ascertainable objectivity, occurring without cause. From this we can logically state that the nature of something (something being an object with "thinghood", as humorously described in class) is its beginning, purpose and stereo-type.
There are two debatable definitions of nature, which under scrutiny are seemingly very similar. On the left hand, we have nature described as "the first, inchoate, thing belonging to it". Simply, an object's nature is it's core material i.e., the nature of my couch would be polystyrene foam. On the other, we have nature described as "the shape or look". This statement points to nature as the stereo-type of an object, that is, my couch dose not have the nature of a couch until it assumes the look of a completed, stereo-typical couch. When examining these definitions it is hard to find a large degree of difference as the stereo-typical couch is not only composed of those parts generally used to construct a couch, but also its acceptance and appearance as a couch.
For further clarification we can examine Aristotle's example of a doctor healing himself. A artisan of medicine dose not have the nature of a healer, as that would imply that he came about this skill naturally, which is not the case. For something to have nature, that nature must come into being without cause. Therefor we can assume that the healer, being an artisan of medicine, is a healer but has the nature of a stereo-typical human being. What then, causes differences amongst couches and people, even between healer A and healer B? This question is answered by exploring the idea of chance. By chance variations are made upon things (with thinghood) not to it's nature, but to it's physical or otherwise growth from it's nature. For this reason we must assume that all things have a categorical nature, with variations to it's structure.
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Nature, in its essence, is the cause/effect relationship offered to things with ascertainable objectivity, occurring without cause. From this we can logically state that the nature of something (something being an object with "thinghood", as humorously described in class) is its beginning, purpose and stereo-type.
There are two debatable definitions of nature, which under scrutiny are seemingly very similar. On the left hand, we have nature described as "the first, inchoate, thing belonging to it". Simply, an object's nature is it's core material i.e., the nature of my couch would be polystyrene foam. On the other, we have nature described as "the shape or look". This statement points to nature as the stereo-type of an object, that is, my couch dose not have the nature of a couch until it assumes the look of a completed, stereo-typical couch. When examining these definitions it is hard to find a large degree of difference as the stereo-typical couch is not only composed of those parts generally used to construct a couch, but also its acceptance and appearance as a couch.
For further clarification we can examine Aristotle's example of a doctor healing himself. A artisan of medicine dose not have the nature of a healer, as that would imply that he came about this skill naturally, which is not the case. For something to have nature, that nature must come into being without cause. Therefor we can assume that the healer, being an artisan of medicine, is a healer but has the nature of a stereo-typical human being. What then, causes differences amongst couches and people, even between healer A and healer B? This question is answered by exploring the idea of chance. By chance variations are made upon things (with thinghood) not to it's nature, but to it's physical or otherwise growth from it's nature. For this reason we must assume that all things have a categorical nature, with variations to it's structure.
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