Agency Theory: an Assessment and Review

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Agency Theory: An Assessment and Review Author(s): Kathleen M. Eisenhardt Source: The Academy of Management Review, Vol. 14, No. 1 (Jan., 1989), pp. 57-74 Published by: Academy of Management Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/258191 Accessed: 14/10/2010 10:43
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? Academy of Management Review, 1989, Vol. 14, No. 1, 57-74.

Agency

Theory: and

An

Assessment

Review

KATHLEEN EISENHARDT M. Stanford University
Agency theory is an important, yet controversial, theory. This paper reviews agency theory, its contributions to organization theory, and the extant empirical work and develops testable propositions. The conclusions are that agency theory (a) offers unique insight into information systems, outcome uncertainty, incentives,



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