Liebmann V. Canada (Minister of National Defense)
Liebmann applied for the position of Executive Assistant to the Commanding Officer in the Persian Gulf Operation. Staff Officers recommended he be appointed and the Commanding Officer agreed. When command staff became aware that Liebmann was Jewish they decided not to select him. Liebmann challenged the decision, as well as CFAO 20-53 (an enactment for which the decision was based upon) under s. 15 of the Charter.
1. Should the court consider the constitutionality of CFAO 20-53? 2. Does the Charter apply to the decision not to appoint Liebmann? 3. Were Liebmann’s equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter infringed? 4. Could infringement be justified under s. 1 of the Charter?
1. The court should not consider the constitutionality of CFAO 20-53 2. The Charter does not apply to the decision not to appoint Liebmann 3. Liebmann’s equality rights under s. 15 of the Charter were infringed 4. The infringement could not be justified under s. 1 of the Charter
1. CFAO 20-53 was not the reason that Liebmann was not permitted to serve in the Persian Gulf and was not in effect when the decision not to give him the position was made. CFAO 20-53 was not relevant to the action before the court and thus should not be considered.
2. The Charter applies to decisions made under delegated statutory authority. The decision regarding Liebmann was made under the authority delegated by the National Defense Act and is thus under the authority of the Charter.
3. Liebmann was treated differently from others based on personal characteristics of the type enumerated in s. 15, and there was definite discrimination in a constitutional sense in that his dignity was demeaned.
4. The respondents did not show that it was reasonable to discriminate against Liebmann because he was Jewish.
• The Charter applies to decisions made under delegated statutory authority • Infringement of s. 15 of the Charter occurs if someone is treated differently based on characteristics outlined in s. 15, and as a result the person’s dignity is demeaned
Montane Ventures Ltd. V. Schroeder (pg. 71)
Relevant Topics: 1. what constitutes a rejection or counter-offer? 2. Equitable remedies: Specific Performance
Montane Ventures – Plaintiff
Frank Schroeder – Defendant
• M entered into k for purchase of land from F
• Completion of agreement subject to M receiving copy of lease (Internet Café) and being satisfied w/ such by Sep. 10th 99 • Sep. 8th 99 telephone conversation b/w M & F where F agrees to provide final inspection certificates from municipality • Sept. 9th 99: M forwarded addendum to F as a confirmation of their telephone conversation re. final inspection certificates • F takes position that M has repudiated/made a counter-offer b/c addendum constitutes a new consideration; as a result, F saw it within his rights to cancel prior agreement and substitute for a new contract w/ a substantially higher price • F sees this as valid on the grounds that the inquiry amounted to rejection and counter-offer, thereby terminating original offer and agreement
1. Does the addendum (the inquiry) constitute a rejection/counter offer to the original agreement? 2. If this does not constitute rejection/counter-offer, should specific performance for the original agreement be awarded to the plaintiff?
• Whether communication constitutes counter-offer or inquiry depends on intention, objectively ascertained, with which was made • Counter-offer amounts to rejecting earlier offer and brings it to an end. If Offeror in turn rejects counter-offer, the original offer does not revive • Inquiries/seeking clarifications does not amount to rejection • Specific performance will normally be awarded to the injured party, at their request, when the dispute...
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