Wittgenstein’s Approach to Ethics
Wittgenstein’s Approach to Ethics
Before attempting to articulate Wittgenstein’s views on ethics I believe we must first examine what he meant when he said ethics was a matter of which we could not sensibly speak. “Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965). If we couple that statement with “Only the supernatural can express the Supernatural” (Wittgenstein 1998, 3e). How then are we to speak of Wittgenstein’s ethics? Wittgenstein believes that the nonsensicality of all ethical expression is not because he has not yet found the correct expressions, but because “that nonsensicality was their very essence” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965).
Two Perspectives:
Wittgenstein provides an answer by describing alternate perspectives; the perspective we inhabit when we are beguiled by a miraculous experience and the perspective we inhabit when we attempt to give expression to the experience. He adds, that to wonder at the existence of the world is “the experience of seeing the world as a miracle” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965) and that having that perspective on the world precluded any verbal expression of the experience which would make sense in the world. From a scientific perspective, a miracle is simply an unexplained event, that is to say, an unexplainable event. When we try to explain the unexplainable we inevitably speak nonsense. All attempts to explain the ethical or the divine will invariably return us to the morally neutral world of facts. The very goal of ethics, to go beyond the world, to experience the divine, is confounded when we attempt to articulate the experience in speech.
“My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965).
Context:
For Wittgenstein, the general rules of contextual use when attempting to ascribe a meaning in speech, such as function and language
Before attempting to articulate Wittgenstein’s views on ethics I believe we must first examine what he meant when he said ethics was a matter of which we could not sensibly speak. “Ethics, if it is anything, is supernatural and our words will only express facts” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965). If we couple that statement with “Only the supernatural can express the Supernatural” (Wittgenstein 1998, 3e). How then are we to speak of Wittgenstein’s ethics? Wittgenstein believes that the nonsensicality of all ethical expression is not because he has not yet found the correct expressions, but because “that nonsensicality was their very essence” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965).
Two Perspectives:
Wittgenstein provides an answer by describing alternate perspectives; the perspective we inhabit when we are beguiled by a miraculous experience and the perspective we inhabit when we attempt to give expression to the experience. He adds, that to wonder at the existence of the world is “the experience of seeing the world as a miracle” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965) and that having that perspective on the world precluded any verbal expression of the experience which would make sense in the world. From a scientific perspective, a miracle is simply an unexplained event, that is to say, an unexplainable event. When we try to explain the unexplainable we inevitably speak nonsense. All attempts to explain the ethical or the divine will invariably return us to the morally neutral world of facts. The very goal of ethics, to go beyond the world, to experience the divine, is confounded when we attempt to articulate the experience in speech.
“My whole tendency and I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language” (A Lecture on Ethics 1965).
Context:
For Wittgenstein, the general rules of contextual use when attempting to ascribe a meaning in speech, such as function and language
Bibliography: “A Lecture on Ethics” Philosophical Review 74 (1965): 3-12. Wittgenstein, L. 1998. Ed. Von Wright, H. G. Culture and value. England: Wiley-Blackwell. Wittgenstein, L.2010. Ed. Hacker, P. Schulte, J. Philosophical investigations. UK: John Wiley and Sons. Wittgenstein, L.1990. Trans. Ogden, C. K. Tractatus Logico-philosophicus. UK: Routledge