The efficiency of economic power politics:
”It will, however, be well for the reader to remeber that frequently the adoption of certain economic policies leading to greater power for a given nation is possible only if there exists an intitial power disequilibrium in favor of that nation” (13) The disequilibrium necessary to adopt ”certain economic policies..” to increase power exists in the rest of the world’s relations to Somalia. Does this make H’s framework (summarized p. 39) useful for designing policies in that context? Question 2
The nature of policy-making:
”It seems probable, however, that the amazing coherence of German policies was due only in part to detailed planning springing from economic analysis and that an important role was left to experimentation in the elaboration of actual policies” (39) Could the kind of mechanism H suggests is at work in generating an ”amazingly coherent” German economic policy work also for developing a policy against Somalia? Question 3
The role of non-state actors
”A place should indeed be left to those who, faced with danger, refuse to follow the policy either of the ostrich or of Gribouille” (71) Is H’s characterization of those who refuse to see companies as an extension of their states policies as ”ostriches” and those who treat them only as such as ”Gribouille” appropriate for thinking about the Somali context? Question 4
The Organization of the international trading system:…if we want to achieve ”international economic collaboration, the exclusive power to organize, regulate, and interfere with trade must be taken away from the hands of single nations. It must be transferred to an international authority able to exercise this power as a sanction against an aggressor nation” (80) We have an international authority (in fact we have authoritieS) of the kind advocated by Hirschman. Has this proven effective in ensuring that economic policies are not used as power politics? Two-fold:
Somalia is not...