A market consists of buyers and sellers of some commodity, say a DVD movie. In this thesis, we assume the role of market operator. Our goal is to ensure that the market has certain desirable properties, which may include fairness, revenue maximization, and so on. We achieve these properties by designing rules for how buyers and sellers can perform transactions. Our main focus will be on matching markets. What is Matching Market? A matching market can be non-bipartite, in which case participants can interact with any other participant. One type of non-bipartite matching market is a barter-exchange market (http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dabraham). An example of a such a market is Swaptree, the mail-based DVD swapping business. (Swaptree also allows swapping of CDs, games, books, and so on.) Customers give Swaptree a list of DVDs they want to own, and a list of DVDs they want to trade. Whenever Swaptree finds an exchange (possibly involving three or more customers), it organizes for the customers to swap their DVDs by mail. In this market, the buyers and sellers coincide, and no money is exchanged.
Matching markets have long held a central place in the game theory, mechanism design and computer science literature. In this thesis, as well as making contributions on the design and analysis of traditional matching markets, we explore a range of new problems that have arisen from more modern markets. These problems include special constraints on which buyers and sellers can interact, and buyers and sellers arriving and leaving the market over time. Perhaps the most significant new aspect of modern markets though is their size, and as such, the problem of finding efficient algorithms for matching buyers and sellers is the central theme in this thesis.
Description of the Study
In today’s generation, there are several movies that are showing in the theater worldwide. So, some people are eagerly want to watch movies at...