The Dropping of the Atomic Bomb during World War II

Universität Kassel
(University of Kassel in Germany)

The U.S. and the decision to drop the bombs

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Table of Contents
1. Introduction.......................................................................................................1
2. Main position of the experts..............................................................................6
3. Conclusion.........................................................................................................8

4. Works cited............................................................................................10

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1 Introduction
There is a lot of controversy surrounding the atomic bombs that the United States dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki during World War Two. There are many different schools of thought on the issue amongst politicians, historians, and scholars, some of which are for, and others against the bomb’s use. While some claim the bomb was military necessary to end the war quickly, to preserve American lives, opponents believe that the bomb was an unnecessary display of power and that the United
States exploited Japan in order to gain a competitive advantage against the Soviets, marking the start of the Cold War between the two nations in the process (cf. Chafe,
Sitkoff, 7; cf. Sherwin, 77).
The first atomic bomb detonated many meters above the city of Hiroshima on the
6th of August, 1945, causing a devastating explosion wich destroyed almost the entire city. After this great shock, which shook the entire world, Japan still would not surrender.
Thus Truman felled compelled to drop a second atomic bomb on August 9th on the seaport of Nagasaki with similar results. Almost 200.000 were killed and 150.000 injured
(cf. Messer, 10).In the following years, many more victims died from nuclear radiation which often resulted in cancer. Six days later, on the 15th of August Japan’s capitulation, in agreement with the Potsdam Declaration, was announced by Emperor Hirohito. This capitulation ended one of the most devastating wars in history, but perhaps started another. The elimination of the two Japanese cities made a cont ribution to the beginning of the Cold War, as well as the decision to withhold any information from the Soviets , therefore denying them any “postwar control over atomic energy” (Bernstein, Hiroshima,
136). The use of the bomb also influenced American and S oviet policies and societies, as well as their economic and military institutions and caused ideological conflicts (cf.
Painter, 1). The original intention to build the bomb was backed by the fear of a nuclear arms race against Germany (cf. Bernstein, Why We). The bombs’ intentions shifted from a military to a diplomatic usage as well as from Germany to Japan, “mostly because experts believed, that Germany was not making a bomb and would surrender before the
American bomb was available as a usable weapon” ( Bernstein, Why We).
In order to understand why Truman made the decision to drop the bombs, we should begin with the legacy of Franklin D. Roosevelt . He took the initiative to build the bomb, “to establish a partnership on atomic energy with Britain” (Ber nstein, 122) after
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the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, to leave the Soviets without any knowledge, and encourage “an American, and partially British monopoly” (Alperovitz, Atomic Dip.,
21). When Truman inherited the presidency on April 12, 1945, he also inherited control over the weapons project (cf. Bernstein,Saving Ame., 124). Even though he left no clear statement on the use of the bomb, Roosevelt often choose policies which supported the potential of the bomb to realize “postwar diplomatic aims” and were equal with the monopolistic and anti-Soviet attitude of the former British Prime Minister, Winston
Churchill (Sherwin,79; cf. Sherwin, 80). The assumption that they saw the bomb as a
“lawful weapon”, “was phrased as policy on a number of occasions”, for example “..that the mission is “to produce [the bomb] at the earliest possible date so as to bring the war to a conclusion” (Bernstein, Saving Ame., 124). Thus the final decision was up to Truman, but it was not that simple as one could have suspected. The catch to this inheritance was the political and personal restriction of Truman to change them and take on a new direction, “...it would have required considerable political courage and confidence for
Truman to alter these policies” of his respectable predecessor (Sherwin, 87). He therefore, chose to keep the former advisors of the late Roosevelt and rely heavily upon them (cf. Bernstein, Saving Ame., 126).
Former collaboration between the U.S. and Soviets solely seemed to have served to defeat Germany; later on they found themselves confronted with many disagreements concerning plans of the postwar control of Europe as well as Asia (cf. Chafe, Sitkoff, 7).
The United States’ top officials sought to establish “ an open door world with the Soviets acceding to American demands (cf. Bernstein, Saving Ame., 13 7). “This included free elections, an open economic door, and the reduction of Soviet influence in Eastern
Europe” (Bernstein, Saving Ame.,137). It therefore seems clear that, the Soviets tried to prevent this and sought to expand their influence and to ga in the superior role in the international community. The Soviet-American relationship suffered greatly from the
American possession of an atomic monopoly, which formed a mean of political pressure
(cf. Chafe, Sitkoff, 7). To acquire a better understanding of the happenings on August 6th and 9th 1945, one has to go further beyond “the decision” and ask for the motives, whether they were based on a military or a political purpose, which other persons and special factors influenced Truman’s decision and how hi storians and scholars evaluate the situation. 4

The top U.S. leaders seemed to have uncovered not only the military, but also the diplomatic advantages the weapons would bring about. According to their beliefs, the bombs could: be “...a threat, or a combat weapon in dealing with the Soviet Union in the postwar world” , impair the necessity “of early Soviet entry into the war ”, support their attempts to obtain Soviet concessions, and thus prevent the growing influence of Russia in terms of politics (Bernstein, Saving Ame., 122;128). These are not the only outcomes they hoped for, the main goal was victory against the Soviet Union as Secretary of War
Stimson later admitted, “the critical questions in American policy toward atomic energy would be directly connected with Soviet Russia.” (Bernstein, Saving Ame., 126, cf. 132).
As we can see the “Soviet factor” becomes a central point in the explanation of the practice of atomic diplomacy as well as the use of the bomb (Alperovitz, Atomic Dip.,
28). According to Bernstein, there is no evidence whether they specifically planned to threaten the Russians, but hoped they would cause a certain impression on the Soviets
(Bernstein, Saving Ame., 128). Still, there are some statements that contain a hint to atomic diplomacy: e.g. Truman´s utterance the Balkan nations are not to be the spheres of influence of any one power”-a direct warning to the Soviet Union. Here was the first, albeit muted, statement of atomic diplomacy: the implicit threat that the bomb could roll back Soviet influence from
Eastern Europe (Bernstein, Saving Ame., 135).

Another aspect which contributes to the atomic-diplomacy-assumption would be the fact that U.S. top-leaders withheld the important information of the possession of an atomic bomb, because they were frightened “that formal disclosure would lead to explicit
Soviet inquiries and then to demands for participation that American leaders were not prepared to handle”(cf. Bernstein, Saving Ame., 123). They believed that keeping the project a secret would eliminate any possibility of the Soviets to talk about this subject without owning up to their espionage within the United States (cf. Bernstein, Saving
Ame., 123).
Furthermore, one important question is whether Truman and his advisors knew about the upcoming surrender of Japan. In this case we are confronted with two opposing opinions. First the revisionist view, which implies that
“contrary to his public justification of the bombings as the only way to end the war without a costly invasion of Japan, Truman had already concluded that Japan was about to surrender. Whether or not he was correct in his estimate of when the war would end, the fact that he held this view at the time he made his decision to use the bomb is clearly set down in his own hand” (Messer, 8).

Orthodox scholars and historians strictly deny Truman’s knowledge about Japan’s
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impending surrender (cf. Sherwin, 78). In addition to this, is Truman’s false idea that
Hiroshima, as well as Nagasaki, were military bases, as proved in a statement he made:
“...Truman 's diary entry for July 25, in which he expresses his determination to use the bomb "so that military objectives are the target and not women and children” (Messer,
18).
Secretary of State James, F. Byrnes, who had great influence on Truman, played another key-role in the decision-making (cf. Alperovitz,Hiroshima, 67). After being
Truman’s senior and mentor in the Senate he held the position of chief advisor (cf.
Alperovitz, Atomic Dip., 26-28). Byrne’s general view was that the possession demonstration of the atomic bomb might help to make an impression on Russia and therefore put the US in a superior position when it came to postwar politics (cf.
Alperovitz,Atomic Dip., 21-26). Convinced of the success of the bomb and believing that a voluntary Soviet withdrawal was out of question, Byrnes´ did not agree on any cooperation with the Soviets( cf. Alperovitz, Atomic Dip., 26). He feared the possible expansion of the Soviet power in Europe and Asia and therefore “was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in”, in particular the enhanced
Soviet political influence this would cause (Alperovitz, Atomic Dip., 26).
Not everyone agreed with the decision to drop the bomb (cf. Alperovitz, Atomic
Dip., 23). Even within the Truman administration, there were some who were against it, one of whom was future president Dwight D. Eisenhower, who claimed that “Japan was, at that very moment, seeking some way to surrender with a minimum loss of “face”.... It wasn 't necessary to hit them with [that] awful thing”(Alperovitz, Atomic Dip., 23). As circumstances changed and Japan was militarily defeated, the bombs seemed unneeded and “many top military figures” were shocked that Truman still insisted on the bombing
(Alperovitz, Atomic Dip., 25).

2 Main position of the experts
Just as the administration was of different opinions concerning the decision to drop the bomb, so are scholars and historians, who can be subdivided into orthodox or traditionalists, revisionists and scholars who hold a neutral position (cf. Chafe, Sitkoff, 7).

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Orthodox historians and scholars defend the decision makers and their decision to drop the bomb, basing their arguments on solely military necessity(cf. Alperovitz,
Hiroshima, 64). The mostly known scholars of this camp are Robert J. Maddox and
Herbert Feis (cf. Maddox, 50-57; Messer, 13). The primary reason was, as Truman explained: “...to end the Second World War as quickly as possible in order to save
American lives” (Bernstein, Saving Ame, 121). Money also played a role, making the bomb the preferred option because it was “the least costly worthwhile operation”
(Maddox, 51). Other possible factors suggested by traditionalists that contributed to the use of the bomb could be the “inherited technological, bureaucratic, and military momentum that built up during the war”(Alperovitz, Hiroshima, 64). This indicates the prevention of a costly invasion. Furthermore, Orthodox scholars insist on nescience of
US officials that Japan was about to surrender (Sherwin, 78). In Maddox’s opinion, the
Japanese still believed they had a chance with the help of a militant party that had control over the government and wanted to continue the war (Maddox, 50-57).
Reports from Tokyo indicated that Japan meant to fight the war to a finish [...] so that
Truman had no reason to believe that the proclamation meant anything other than what it said (Maddox, 51).

According to their point of view:
There had been no ulterior political motives: neither domestic, in justifying a very expensive weapons development project, nor international, in regard to any power other than Japan (Messer, 12),

this indicates the denial of the assumption supported by revisionists, that “atomic diplomacy”(Bernstein, Saving Ame., 136) played a role.
Contrary to the Orthodox defenders are revisionists, who lay their reasoning on the ground of so-called “atomic diplomacy” (Bernstein,Saving Ame., 136) which, as they argue, was practiced by top US. Officials (cf. Chafe, Sitkoff, 7). Best-known representatives of this camp are Gar Alperovitz, Robert Messer and Martin J. Sherwin.
Their central argument is that the bombs were used to alter Soviet behavior contrarily to the military explanation of the Orthodox, and therefore question their necessity to end the war (cf. Chafe, Sitkoff, 7; Bernstein, Saving Ame., 132). This assumption indicates the accusation of “atomic diplomacy”(Bernstein, Saving Ame., 136). According to Barton J.
Bernstein atomic diplomacy can be defined as “ the use of nuclear weapons as threats or as bargaining levers to secure advantages from the Soviet Union”(Bernstein, Saving
Ame., 134). Revisionists furthermore suggest that the bombs served to strengthen the
American position against the Soviet Union, “to end the conflict before the Soviet Union
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had an opportunity to declare war on Japan, march into Manchuria, and lay claim to the concessions”(Sherwin, 77), to prevent an endangerment of plans for the postwar occupation, especially the control over Germany and to offer the possible Soviet acceptance of elections and open trade in Eastern Europe (Sherwin.77; cf. Maddox, 65).
Even racist motives, as they see it, might have played a role to support the decisionmakers- like Truman stated: “"When you have to deal with a beast you have to treat him as a beast."” (Messer, 12). In addition, they assume that other alternatives to end the war were not considered, because political leaders felt obligated to use the bomb after spending huge sums on the development. In Gar Alperovitz´s opinion, the decision to use the bomb can be laid on the ground of that he and the president simply got so caught up in the assumption that the bomb would be vital to their diplomacy that they blinded themselves to information which was evident to other high-ranking officials (Alperovitz, Atomic Dip., 27).

Other representatives of this camp agree, that the bombs were not necessary to end the war, that the administration knew or should have known this, that the administration knew that Japan was on the verge of defeat and therefore close to surrender, and that the administration was either short-sighted or had other controlling international-political motives (besides ending the war)
(Bernstein, Saving Ame. 132).

The final camp would be those historians and scholars who hold a neutral position and try to reconstruct the decision to drop the bomb from the government’s viewpoint.
One of their most established representatives is Barton J. Bernstein. They argue that the bomb was seen as a legitimate weapon for the combat use against the enemy, an assump tion that Truman adopted without question and therefore used to end the war as quickly as possible (cf. Sherwin, 87). Moreover, the revenge of Japan played another important role,
Americans and wanted to make the Japanese pay for it. In addition Bernstein mentions,

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It would help win the war, save U.S. lives, punish Japan for Pearl Harbor and war atrocities, help impose American terms in a surrender, justify the secret expenditures and, as a possible bonus, also frighten the Soviet Union and make the Soviets more tractable in he postwar period (Bernstein, Why We).

3 Conclusion
After carefully examining all the different major historical schools of tho ught on this subject, the traditionalist camp seems the most inaccurate . As I see it, the dropping of the atomic bombs was an unnecessarily brutal act against Japan. There had to have been more peaceful options than using a revolutionarily destructive bomb to kill so many
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people, but Truman chose not to use them. It does not seem possible that Truman and his administration did not know about the upcoming surrender of Japan, since the U.S. information system is so good. It is well known, that American agenci es that gathered information for the government appeared to have been doing a very good job of collecting and analyzing information on Japan’s situation in the war. While the strongest argument for using the bomb was that it would end the war quicker, saving lives, there is much evidence to contradict that argument (Messer, 13).
That saving lives was not the highest priority, however, seems obvious from the choices made in July: If the United States really wished to end the war as quickly and surely as possible--and to save as many lives as possible--then as Marshall had pointed out as early as June, the full force of the Russian shock plus assurances for the Emperor could not be left out of the equation (Alperovitz, Hiroshima, 63).

In my opinion, the U.S. had already taken actions to prove that saving lives was not a priority. It seems, there was much more to the story than the saving of lives. The dropping of the atomic bomb was all about the distribution of world power and the fight for global leadership between the United States and Soviet Union (Painter, 1-2).

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4 Works Cited
Literature
Alperovitz, Gar. “Hirsoshima: Historians Reassess“ in Griffith, Robert (Ed.), Major Prob lems in American history since 1945, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001, 57-68.
Alperovitz, Gar. “More on Atomic Diplomacy“ in Chafe, William Henry; Sitkoff, Har vard, A history of our time: readings on postwar America, New York, Oxford University
Press, 1995, 20-30.
Baker, Paula; Griffith, Robert; Paterson, Thomas G.. Major problems in American history since 1945, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001.
Bernstein, Barton J. “Saving American Lives And Pressing The Soviets: The Atomic
Bomb Decision And The Cold War“ in McMahon, Robert J.; Paterson, Thomas G.. The
Origins of the Cold War (Problems in American Civilization), Andover, Cengage Learn ing, 1998, 121-137.
Barton J. Bernstein: “Why We Dropped the Bomb”, George Mason University´s History
News Network, 2005 (http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/13531.html ) (26.10.2010)
Chafe, William Henry; Sitkoff, Harvard. A history of our time: readings on postwar
America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995.
Leffler, Melvyn P.; Painter, David S.. Origins of the Cold War: an international history,
Abingdon, Routledge, 2005.
Maddox, Robert James. “The Biggest Decision: Why We Had to Drop the Atomic Bomb“ in Griffith, Robert (Ed.), Major Problems in American history since 1945, Boston,
Houghton Mifflin Company,2001, 50-57.
McMahon, Robert J.; Paterson, Thomas G.. The Origins of the Cold War (Problems in
American Civilization), Andover, Cengage Learning, 1998.
Messer, Robert L.. “New Evidence on Truman´s Decision“ in Chafe, William Henry;
Sitkoff, Harvard, A history of our time: readings on postwar America, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1995, 8-19.
Painter, David S.. The Cold War: An International History. Abingdon, Routledge, 1999.
Sherwin, Martin J.. “The Atomic Bomb And The Origins Of The Cold War“ in Leffler,
Melvyn P.; Painter, David S., Origins of the Cold War: an international history, Abingdon,
Routledge, 2005, 77-91.

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Hiermit erkläre ich, dass ich die vorliegende Arbeit selbständig und ohne Benutzung anderer als der angegebenen Hilfsmittel und Quellen einschließlich des Internets angefertigt habe. Alle Stellen, die wörtlich oder sinngemäß aus veröffentlichten und nicht veröffentlichten Schriften entnommen wurden, sind als solche kenntlich gemacht. Die
Arbeit ist in gleicher oder Ähnlicher Form oder auszugsweise im Rahmen einer anderen
Prufung noch nicht vorgelegt worden.

Kassel, den 28.10.2010

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Cited: Alperovitz, Gar. “More on Atomic Diplomacy“ in Chafe, William Henry; Sitkoff, Har vard, A history of our time: readings on postwar America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995, 20-30. Baker, Paula; Griffith, Robert; Paterson, Thomas G.. Major problems in American history since 1945, Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 2001. Origins of the Cold War (Problems in American Civilization), Andover, Cengage Learn ing, 1998, 121-137. Barton J. Bernstein: “Why We Dropped the Bomb”, George Mason University´s History News Network, 2005 (http://hnn.us/roundup/entries/13531.html ) (26.10.2010) Chafe, William Henry; Sitkoff, Harvard. A history of our time: readings on postwar America, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995. Leffler, Melvyn P.; Painter, David S.. Origins of the Cold War: an international history, Abingdon, Routledge, 2005. McMahon, Robert J.; Paterson, Thomas G.. The Origins of the Cold War (Problems in American Civilization), Andover, Cengage Learning, 1998. University Press, 1995, 8-19. Painter, David S.. The Cold War: An International History. Abingdon, Routledge, 1999. Routledge, 2005, 77-91.