The Kantian View of Animal Ethics
Kant’s Ethics of Metaphysics: A Response To the Charge of Speciesism
I.
In this paper I will present the charge of speciesism contended by many animal right’s activists. I will attempt to substantiate Immanuel Kant’s view on animal morality and justify how his philosophy is not in violation of speciesism. Furthermore, I will explain how the Kantian view still grants animals some moral consideration through the designation of “indirect duties”. Lastly, I will present a difficulty with accepting the Kantian view of “indirect duties” towards animals. Moral quandaries regarding animals are still demanding the attention of many philosophers as they attempt to modify and inspect the relationship between morality and social policy. Contemporary applications of this issue can range from experimentations on animals for developing medicines (or even cosmetics) to whether human beings should avoid eating animal-based foods. There is a vast spectrum of moral issues that arise with respect to animals. However, most of the morally questionable situations are contingent on one fundamental question: do animals even have moral rights? And if so, to what extent? Although animal moral considerability has peaked the interest of many contemporary philosophers, such as James Rachels and Peter Singer, the question is really an age-old question that can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. Immanuel Kant has probed the question of whether an animal has moral considerability. Kant continuously makes the distinction between humans and animals throughout his best-known contributions to moral philosophy. Therefore, I will address and present the counter-argument to the charge of speciesism, one of critical arguments of the animal rights movement, through a Kantian lens.
II.
One of the prevailing charges on humanity proposed by champions of animal rights is that humans act in violation of ‘speciesism’. The term, first coined by psychologist Richard Ryder in 1973, is used to
I.
In this paper I will present the charge of speciesism contended by many animal right’s activists. I will attempt to substantiate Immanuel Kant’s view on animal morality and justify how his philosophy is not in violation of speciesism. Furthermore, I will explain how the Kantian view still grants animals some moral consideration through the designation of “indirect duties”. Lastly, I will present a difficulty with accepting the Kantian view of “indirect duties” towards animals. Moral quandaries regarding animals are still demanding the attention of many philosophers as they attempt to modify and inspect the relationship between morality and social policy. Contemporary applications of this issue can range from experimentations on animals for developing medicines (or even cosmetics) to whether human beings should avoid eating animal-based foods. There is a vast spectrum of moral issues that arise with respect to animals. However, most of the morally questionable situations are contingent on one fundamental question: do animals even have moral rights? And if so, to what extent? Although animal moral considerability has peaked the interest of many contemporary philosophers, such as James Rachels and Peter Singer, the question is really an age-old question that can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle. Immanuel Kant has probed the question of whether an animal has moral considerability. Kant continuously makes the distinction between humans and animals throughout his best-known contributions to moral philosophy. Therefore, I will address and present the counter-argument to the charge of speciesism, one of critical arguments of the animal rights movement, through a Kantian lens.
II.
One of the prevailing charges on humanity proposed by champions of animal rights is that humans act in violation of ‘speciesism’. The term, first coined by psychologist Richard Ryder in 1973, is used to
Cited: 1) Ryder, Richard. "Richard Ryder: All Beings That Feel Pain Deserve Human Rights | World News | The Guardian." Latest News, Sport and Comment from the Guardian | The Guardian. Web. 27 Dec. 2011. . 2) Kant, Immanuel, and H. J. Paton. Groundwork of the Metaphysic of Morals. New York: Harper & Row, 1964. Print. 3) Sommers, Christina, Frederic Tamler Sommers. Vice and Virtue in Everyday Life. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003. Print 4) Korsgaard, Christine M. "Fellow Creatures: Kantian Ethics and Our Duties to Animals." Www.Tannerlectures.utah.edu. University of Utah Press Volume 25/26. Web Author’s personal website 5) Sebo, Jeff. "A Critique of the Kantian Theory of Indirect Moral Duties to Animals." Animal Liberation Philosophy and Policy Journal Volume II Pp. 1-14, 2004. Web.