The City State Analogy in the Republic
I. Introduction
Plato’s definition of justice in The Republic1 is based upon his division of the individual soul (psychē) and the state (polis) into three mutually interrelated parts. In this essay I will examine the structure of Plato’s analogy between the soul and the state in order to determine whether it is able to support a meaningful definition of justice in spite of charges of circularity and incoherence that are levelled against it. I will begin by considering Plato’s argument for the division of the soul into three logical elements, or parts, along with various objections to it, before moving on to consider the relationship between soul and state. In particular, I will argue that the precise nature of this relationship highlights a crucial aspect of Plato’s conception of justice that allows him to overcome the above criticisms of his analogy, which is more complex and subtle than might first appear.
In order to understand Plato’s analogy between soul and state, we must first be clear about what he means by the ‘soul’ and its ‘parts’. ‘Soul’ is the common translation of the Greek word psychē, which may also be rendered as ‘character’, ‘personality’ (Pappas 1995: 84), or even ‘mind’ or ‘self’. However, despite the religious connotations, its use in this context does carry any particular spiritual or theological significance. The terms that Plato uses to refer to the parts of the soul are similarly generic and suggest a general categorisation of impulses, or logical element, rather than the primarily constitutive role that the English word ‘part’ might suggest (Lee in Plato 2003: 140). It will be helpful to bear these points in mind in order to clarify various aspects of Plato’s account that might otherwise be obscured by an overly literal interpretation of the translated text.
II. The Three Parts of the Soul
Plato divides the soul into three distinct parts (illustrated in Figure 1) according to what might be called the ‘Principle of Opposites’
Plato’s definition of justice in The Republic1 is based upon his division of the individual soul (psychē) and the state (polis) into three mutually interrelated parts. In this essay I will examine the structure of Plato’s analogy between the soul and the state in order to determine whether it is able to support a meaningful definition of justice in spite of charges of circularity and incoherence that are levelled against it. I will begin by considering Plato’s argument for the division of the soul into three logical elements, or parts, along with various objections to it, before moving on to consider the relationship between soul and state. In particular, I will argue that the precise nature of this relationship highlights a crucial aspect of Plato’s conception of justice that allows him to overcome the above criticisms of his analogy, which is more complex and subtle than might first appear.
In order to understand Plato’s analogy between soul and state, we must first be clear about what he means by the ‘soul’ and its ‘parts’. ‘Soul’ is the common translation of the Greek word psychē, which may also be rendered as ‘character’, ‘personality’ (Pappas 1995: 84), or even ‘mind’ or ‘self’. However, despite the religious connotations, its use in this context does carry any particular spiritual or theological significance. The terms that Plato uses to refer to the parts of the soul are similarly generic and suggest a general categorisation of impulses, or logical element, rather than the primarily constitutive role that the English word ‘part’ might suggest (Lee in Plato 2003: 140). It will be helpful to bear these points in mind in order to clarify various aspects of Plato’s account that might otherwise be obscured by an overly literal interpretation of the translated text.
II. The Three Parts of the Soul
Plato divides the soul into three distinct parts (illustrated in Figure 1) according to what might be called the ‘Principle of Opposites’
Bibliography: Annas, J. 1981: An Introduction to Plato’s Republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press Crombie, I. M. 1962: An Examination of Plato’s Doctrines. New York: Humanities Press Kenny, A. 1973: The Anatomy of the Soul. Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott Pappas, Nicolas 1995: Plato and The Republic. London: Routledge Plato 2000: The Republic. T Griffith (trans.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press ————— 2003: The Republic. D Lee (trans.). London: Penguin Stalley, R.F. 1975: ‘Plato’s Argument for the Division of the Reasoning and Appetitive Elements Within the Soul’. Phronesis, 20, pp. 110–28. Williams, B. 1999: ‘The Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic’. In Plato 2, G. Fine (ed.), pp. 255–64.