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Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Chris Guthrie
Andrew J. Wistrich

Abstract
When judges assess probable cause, they must do so either in foresight (when determining whether to issue a warrant) or in hindsight (when determining whether to allow the admission of evidence obtained without a search warrant). Although the legal standard for probable cause is the same, and the facts that might support cause are the same, judges who assess probable cause in hindsight invariably know whether a search produced incriminating evidence or not. Research on the hindsight bias suggests that judges will be unable to set aside this knowledge and judge probable cause as if they were working in foresight. In this paper, we present of three experiments in which we asked 900 state and federal judges to make judgments of probable cause either in foresight or in hindsight, in hypothetical cases. Surprisingly, we found that that judges make similar rulings on probable cause in foresight and in hindsight. We also found that hindsight appears to cloud judges’ abilities to assess the likely outcome of the search, but hindsight does not influence their legal judgments.

I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures creates a decision-making dilemma for judges.1 It requires that judges supervise police investigations. The centerpiece of the Fourth Amendment’s protection of personal privacy lies in the requirement that is that the police must get permission to conduct such searches by obtaining a warrant from a judge.2 But in the common circumstance in which an exigency prevents a police officer from obtaining a warrant, the judge must assess probable while knowing that the search was successful.3 Decades of research on judgment in hindsight suggest that such judgments will be biased, as people cannot suppress the influence of known outcomes on their judgments— a phenomenon known as

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The Fourth...
Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1877125
1
Probable Cause, Probability, and Hindsight
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski
Chris Guthrie
Andrew J. Wistrich
Abstract
When judges assess probable cause, they must do so either in foresight (when
determining whether to issue a warrant) or in hindsight (when determining whether to
allow the admission of evidence obtained without a search warrant). Although the legal
standard for probable cause is the same, and the facts that might support cause are the
same, judges who assess probable cause in hindsight invariably know whether a search
produced incriminating evidence or not. Research on the hindsight bias suggests that
judges will be unable to set aside this knowledge and judge probable cause as if they
were working in foresight. In this paper, we present of three experiments in which we
asked 900 state and federal judges to make judgments of probable cause either in
foresight or in hindsight, in hypothetical cases. Surprisingly, we found that that judges
make similar rulings on probable cause in foresight and in hindsight. We also found that
hindsight appears to cloud judges abilities to assess the likely outcome of the search, but
hindsight does not influence their legal judgments.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Fourth Amendments prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures
creates a decision-making dilemma for judges.1 It requires that judges supervise police
investigations. The centerpiece of the Fourth Amendments protection of personal privacy
lies in the requirement that is that the police must get permission to conduct such
searches by obtaining a warrant from a judge.2 But in the common circumstance in
which an exigency prevents a police officer from obtaining a warrant, the judge must
assess probable while knowing that the search was successful.3 Decades of research on
judgment in hindsight suggest that such judgments will be biased, as people cannot
suppress the influence of known outcomes on their judgmentsa phenomenon known as
1 The Fourth Amendment states, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be
searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
2 Chimel v California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969) (“The police must, whenever practical, obtain advance
judicial approval of searches and seizures through the warrant procedure”); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S.
347, 357 (1967) (“searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment ”). See William J. Stuntz, Warrants and
Fourth Amendment Remedies, 77 VA. L. REV. 881, 882 (1991).
3 See Craig M. Bradley, Two Models of the Fourth Amendment Remedies, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1468, 1473
(1985).