Spinoza's Theory of Emotions
Christian Scherrer, student number: 013851259
Analysing and synthesizing passions Aspects of Cartesian and Spinozist method
It has often been noted that in the third part of his „Ethics“ Spinoza follows in his list of definitions of affects to a great extent the one of passions given by Descartes in his “Passions de l'Ame” (apart from divergent evaluations of some of the passions1, like Spinoza´s refusal to include admiratio among them). It also appears that both of them are building a taxonomy of passions that introduces some kind of hierarchical order among these. We find both in Descartes as well as in Spinoza a set of passions2 out or by means of which further, in some sense more complex or specific passions are being developed from. What will be my guiding interest in this essay, is to compare and distinguish the two theories of passion according to the sense in which basic or primary passions are named thus and the way they are being discovered or identified and thereby hinting at a difference on the more general level of methodology. I want to begin with what is a starting point in Descartes´ and Spinoza´s defining the passions in a general manner. It is very interesting and insightful to compare the procedures through which they arrive at their different conceptions of passions and at identifying and defining the basic ones. It is true that they both operate with the notion of causa as a starting point for their distinction between action and passion, but we should draw our attention to what follows and what comes in between their principles of causality and the definitions of the basic affects to rightly appreciate the differ ence in their approaches. In reality, though, we already find important differences in the relational structure between the notions of action, passion and cause. In the very first paragraph of the “Passions de l'Ame”, Descartes starts with a very general principle, adopted from other philosophers, which consists in distinguishing
Analysing and synthesizing passions Aspects of Cartesian and Spinozist method
It has often been noted that in the third part of his „Ethics“ Spinoza follows in his list of definitions of affects to a great extent the one of passions given by Descartes in his “Passions de l'Ame” (apart from divergent evaluations of some of the passions1, like Spinoza´s refusal to include admiratio among them). It also appears that both of them are building a taxonomy of passions that introduces some kind of hierarchical order among these. We find both in Descartes as well as in Spinoza a set of passions2 out or by means of which further, in some sense more complex or specific passions are being developed from. What will be my guiding interest in this essay, is to compare and distinguish the two theories of passion according to the sense in which basic or primary passions are named thus and the way they are being discovered or identified and thereby hinting at a difference on the more general level of methodology. I want to begin with what is a starting point in Descartes´ and Spinoza´s defining the passions in a general manner. It is very interesting and insightful to compare the procedures through which they arrive at their different conceptions of passions and at identifying and defining the basic ones. It is true that they both operate with the notion of causa as a starting point for their distinction between action and passion, but we should draw our attention to what follows and what comes in between their principles of causality and the definitions of the basic affects to rightly appreciate the differ ence in their approaches. In reality, though, we already find important differences in the relational structure between the notions of action, passion and cause. In the very first paragraph of the “Passions de l'Ame”, Descartes starts with a very general principle, adopted from other philosophers, which consists in distinguishing