South African Hegemony: a Closer Look

South African Hegemony:
A closer look

Alex Jankovsky
Independent Study
Professor Lefebvre

South Africa has a rich cultural and political history that can be traced back to before the 19th century as a trading centre in the South African region. This paper will attempt to analyze the factors that affected the progression of the South African state through its inception to the present day. Particular emphasis will be given to its geopolitical importance, the colonial impact and political history that helped formed its advanced infrastructure that would allow it to surpass its neighboring states. As well as the impact of external influences in shaping and supporting the South African regime towards developing the means to reinforce its role as a regional leader in the area. Concurrently, the paper also analyzes the internal development of South African institutions and how they have developed leading up to the present day. Ultimately, the purpose of this paper will be to take these factors and prove the South African has been able to maintain its status as the regional hegemon of Southern Africa. The geography of South Africa and its demography favors the potential for a strong South African defense. Minerals were discovered in the region in the 1800s. South Africa also proved to be valuable as a trading post for ships coming from the east, and later became of geopolitical importance due to its proximity and access to the sea lanes. Its location and abundance of minerals motivated colonial powers to value South Africa’s geopolitical importance. Following the Second World War, the economic potential, and its strategic importance caught the interest of the U.S.

“The area constitutes the major non-Communist source of supply of a number of minerals, important to the West’s advanced industrial economies: chromium, platinum and manganese. The sea lanes that lie around the region have equal value to the West. More than half of the Western Europe’s oil and well over 20 percent of the United States’ oil travels through these waters on its way from the Persian Gulf to its ultimate destination.”

The region, and especially South Africa, has a great wealth of minerals, and these resources are plainly of significance to the West. In 1870 diamonds were discovered in Kimberley, while in 1886 some of the world’s largest gold deposits were discovered in the Witwatersrand region of Transvaal, quickly transforming the South African economy into a resource dominated one. Due to the resources found in the area, South Africa has been able to build a strong export-based economy that has allowed it to surpass its neighbor’s capabilities and become relatively self-sufficient (in regard to foreign aid). The roots of the Boer-British conflict can be traced back to Britain remodeling the administration along British lines, by calling for better treatment of the Colored and blacks who worked for the Boers as servants or slaves, by granting (Ordinance 50, 1828) free nonwhites legal rights equal to those of the whites, and by restricting the acquisition of new land by the Boers. In 1833 slavery was abolished in the British Empire, an act that angered South African slave-owners, but the freed slaves remained oppressed and continued to be exploited by white landowners. This would ultimately affect South African Politics and foreign policy, as the two powers would compete for dominance. The Anglo-Boer War broke out on 11 October 1899 between the two former republics (Free State and Transvaal) and Britain. As the war escalated Britain brought reinforcements from Australia, New Zealand and Canada as well as some volunteers from other British colonies. The war lasted three years with a very high casualty rate on both sides. In his January 1902 report, General Smuts describes how the British recruited the Bantus:

"In the Cape Colony the uncivilized Blacks have been told that if the Boers win, slavery will be brought back in the Cape Colony. They have been promised Boer property and farmsteads if they will join the English; that the Boers will have to work for the Blacks, and that they will be about to marry...

Of special importance is the final phase of the war, after the capitals Bloemfontein and Pretoria were captured and the Boer forces resorted to guerrilla warfare. To combat the Boer guerilla strategy the British adopted a two pronged strategy: the so-called scorched earth policy and the removal of the Boer women and children to concentration camps. It was during this phase of the war that the suffering of the Black people intensified. Since the farms were destroyed, livestock killed and crops burnt, the farm laborers and their families were taken to refugee camps in which many of them died. The main reason for the war was the British desire to gain control of the gold mines in the Witwatersrand, the most important priority was to re-establish white control over the land and force the Africans back to wage labor. The labor-recruiting system was improved, both internally and externally. The last phase of the war had a lasting impact both on South African politics and society. It would set the precedent for the British influence on the political system and remind the indigenous populations what they were valued for: economic exploitation. The Boer leaders Louis Botha, Jan Smuts and J.B.M. Hertzog played a dominant role in the country’s politics for the next half century. The British looked to the Afrikaners as collaborators in securing imperial political and economic interests. Political culture has arguably been identified as the greatest influence in shaping the way that people behave politically. From the external perspective, political culture consists of ideologies, myths and religions that individuals are socialized to believe. From the internal perspective, political culture focuses on people’s orientations to politics: their attitudes and opinions about political leaders, political movements, political events, and political institutions. It encompasses their feelings of legitimacy and alienation, their sense of national identity, and the political groups with which they identify. The policy of ‘apartheid’ can be traced back to the colonial legacy. The colonial settlers did not see their settlements and holdings as territories in which a substantial, self-sufficient political infrastructure needed to exist, such as that of the home country. Rather, colonists felt that the territory should be exploited to bring about the highest return at the lowest cost disregarding any negative consequences to the indigenous populations that would arise as a result of this pursuit of wealth. The political institutions set up in the territories were highly bureaucratic and authoritarian, using coercion to enforce order and policies. Due to the system of colonialism, a lack of state penetration existed that led to weak links between state and society. Colonial political authority had been gained on the continent through conquest, and political institutions were imposed. Therefore, coercion acted as a substitute for legitimacy. The social contract between the governments and its people was never understood or acknowledged. Time is a crucial factor in developing the common history that people share with each other, and so as a result over time South Africa’s political culture was heavily influenced by the colonial legacy and subsequently the apartheid that followed. Historically, South African and earlier Afrikaner relations with black peoples go back to the time when the Dutch East India Company and the British Government made treaties with various Bantu chiefs. Initially, the white powers had to deal with and recognize African chiefs as sovereign foreign rulers in order to make agreements with them. The need for co-operation between the four British colonies in Southern Africa became evident after the conclusion of the Peace Treaty of Vereeniging. A National Convention was established at which a draft Constitution for the political unification of the four territories was drawn up. The British Government accepted the proposed constitution and it was passed by Parliament in Westminister as the South Africa Act, 1909. The act came into effect on May 31st, 1910. In terms of this constitution the colonies Cape of Good Hope, Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal became provinces of the Union of South Africa. Once the Union of South Africa was established, in 1910, the country’s relations with its African neighbors were exclusively with the European colonial powers, including the British Empire. This foreign policy tendency reflected that of the colonial powers during the time, and as a result, psychologically set the mindset of South African politicians above that of their neighbors. As a result, supporting an outward-looking policy for South African politicians was taken on towards regional development. After elections in 1910, Louis Botha became the first prime minister; he headed the South African party, a combination of Afrikaner parties that advocated close cooperation between Afrikaners and people from Britain. In 1912, the Afrikaner-oriented National party was founded by J. B. M. Hertzog founded. Botha led (1914) South Africa into World War I on the side of the Allies and quickly squashed a revolt by Afrikaners who opposed this alignment. In 1915, South African forces captured South West Africa (present-day Namibia) from the Germans, and after the war the territory was placed under the Union as a League of Nations mandate. In 1919, Botha was succeeded as prime minister by his close associate J. C. Smuts. In 1921–22 skilled white mine workers on the Witwatersrand, fearful of losing their jobs to lower-paid nonwhites, staged a major strike, which Smuts ended only with a use of force that cost about 230 lives. As a result, Hertzog was elected prime minister in 1924 and remained in office until 1939. Hertzog led an Afrikaner cultural and economic revival through various policies. He was influential in gaining additional British recognition of South African independence through the Balfour Declaration of 1926 and the Statute of Westminster of 1931. In 1934, the Union Parliament became the sovereign legislature in the Union with the passing of the Status of the Union Act, 1934. This was significant, as it was the first step towards real autonomy and power as a political actor for South Africa. Hertzog took South Africa off the gold standard in 1932(Dec.), and was able to raise the price of gold and stimulate the gold-mining industry and the economy in general. This showed how much the economy was affected by gold and how much the economy was directly connected to its mineral/gold market. He was successful in furthering the consolidation of white-minority power, by curtailing the electoral power of nonwhites and furthering the system of allocating “reserved” areas for blacks as their permanent homes, while at the same time regulating their movement in the remainder of the country. Ultimately, these social reforms and moves made by Hertzog would help strengthen the infrastructure of the South African political system. Winning a crucial vote in parliament in 1939, Smuts became prime minister again and brought South Africa into the war on the Allied side. South African troops made an important contribution to the Allied war effort, helping to end Italian control in Ethiopia and fighting with distinction in Italy and Madagascar. South African engagement was important during WWII because it gave the South African military experience and prestige in the international community. Facing harsh criticism from the Commonwealth in 1961, South Africa left the Commonwealth and became a republic. In the 1960s there were international attempts to take South West Africa from South Africa 's control, but South Africa persistently maintained its hold on the territory. From the late 1960s, the Vorster government began to try to start a dialogue on racial and other matters with independent African nations. The issue of apartheid came to be a major setback, as these attempts were met with little success. However, South Africa was successful in the establishment of diplomatic relations with Malawi and the adjacent nations of Lesotho, Botswana, and Swaziland, all of which were economically dependent on South Africa. The economic dependence of these nations points to the economic influence of South Africa as a regional power. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, African states were gaining independence and taking their places in various international bodies. They were starting to assert themselves in international councils and the Western European, American, and communist powers seemed to be listening. This resulted in a widespread optimism in African capitals and a feeling that the corner had been turned, that racist and white minority regimes would be displaced before long. These feelings proved to be naïve, as the force and support of the status quo was entrenched deeply. The southern African regional political system seems to be a fundamentally unstable one, despite its surprising endurance. Since gaining control of government in the 1948 election, political power in white South Africa has been centered in the National Party. To understand domestic politics, all other forms of political power must be viewed as how they affect or are affected by the Afrikaner power structure. Therefore black power, although growing in militancy and significance, is thus far constrained by the Afrikaner power structure, and in turn contributes to a weakening or consolidating of that power. Afrikaner power is the “…benchmark against which all other claimants to power must be measured.” Their dominance of state power has not been seriously challenged for as long as Afrikaners have determined that their security and ‘survival’ as a unique nation necessitates that unyielding and virtually unrestrained assertion of their control. The cabinet has generally been the effective policy-making body of the Party. As such the cabinet demonstrates the relatively narrow parameters of power in the country. At the Party’s highest level, the cabinet is an elitist body in the midst of an ostensibly populist movement. The individuals in South African politics cannot be ignored when it comes to analyzing their contribution to the rise of the state. Each prime minister had his own operating style, but could not ignore demands of party structure and Afrikaner expectations. However, within this context, there is considerable latitude. The terms of H.F. Verwoerd, B. J. Vorster, and P. W. Botha reflect their personalities, their perceptions of the issues and the range of politically acceptable alternatives, and the situational variables of the day. Verwoerd was an overpowering figure in the Party and once having asserted himself, was virtually authoritarian. Vorster’s tenure saw a more relaxed, consensus-building approach to Party leadership as the Afrikaner business interests rose in prominence. P.W. Botha, himself a professional politician, contributed to the rise of the bureaucracy, the defense establishment, and the career politicians. Party loyalists, especially those close to P.W. Botha, have moved into positions or authority. In the process of these changes, the Party instruments have been downgraded in political significance. In the top decision-making councils, they have been superceded by governmental and, to a lesser extent, selected members of the bureaucracy. Playing their parts in this process of power manipulation and consensus formation have been an increasingly outspoken Afrikans press, a quiescent Dutch Reformed Church with pockets of dissent, and the Broederbond, a closed and self-perpetuating secret debating society that seeks to contain divergency among Afrikaner leaders. Their power was significant in the 1970s, but waned in the 1980s. In 1984 a new, more reactionary opponent of the Broederbond was formed, the Afrikanervolkswag. It called itself as a “cultural organization” that is determined to unite conservative opposition to the government’s modulated changes. Although the public institutions and administrative practices of the new Union were largely based on those that had been established in the four colonies during the periods of responsible government, this was the start of a national civil service for the newly created state. The national civil service created was also to include the majority of the officials employed in the administrations of the four provinces. Local government officials were, however, never part of the national civil service. After the Union in 1910, a Public Service Commission was created in 1912 with the power to make recommendations to political functionaries on civil service matters such as the grading and classification of posts, appointments, promotions, termination of service and the organization and reorganization of departments. During the apartheid era, the South African Defence Force (SADF) was a white-dominated establishment that enjoyed a privileged relationship with the presidency, both in terms of budget and influence on decision-making. The SADF was unaccountable to parliament, and military operations were undertaken in the absence of public scrutiny. The security establishment includes all those individuals and institutions, whether a formal part of the governmental and administrative apparatus of the state or attached to private and parastatal organizations, that are chiefly concerned with the maintenance of the South African state primarily by developing and employing the coercive instruments of the state or by weakening by various means the coercive arms of hostile states and movements. First and most obviously the security establishment includes the South African Defence Force (SADF), the Department of Defence, and the South African Police (SAP), particularly its paramilitary units. Incorporated as well are the various branches of the intelligence community. Some governmental parastatal corporations, particularly the industrial giant Armscor, are defense-oriented, as are dozens of private firms that do work on subcontract from Armscor. The intellectual community, including private and quasi-official think tanks, has also been recruited into this constellation of groups. The official vehicle for coordinating and expressing the views of these of these disparate components has been, of late, the State Security Council (SSC) and especially its secretariat. All these groups are deeply engaged in the debate over defense and strategic policy and have helped broaden the demarcation of strategic affairs. However, strategic matters have come to hold an expanded political purpose for those in power. “State policy in strategic terms involves the maintenance of the regime, including its domestic features as well as its territorial integrity.” Consequently, those who control the security instruments of the state, contribute to the determination of the internal order of things. Central to an understanding of the rise of the security establishment is an appreciation that South Africa’s governmental officials live in a world that they perceive to be fundamentally hostile to South Africa, a world whose attitude can be summarized as “total onslaught.” Between 1974 and 1978 South Africa’s defense expenditure more than tripled. From 481,000,000 R million to 1,712,000,000 R million. The geographical lay out of South Africa and its demography favors a South African defense. With little heavily forested terrain or habitable mountain areas, this terrain allows for the SADF to quickly isolate and destroy guerrilla groups. The demographic favors the South African government since there are concentrations of whites in key areas throughout South Africa and white farmers and traders in almost every part of South Africa. The structure of the SADF in the 1960s prepared it to engage and defeat guerilla forces. In the event that there was a subversive group threatening the regime, the South African Citizen Force units were prepared to defend their home areas with support from the “home guard” formations. At the same time, combat teams would use their own aircrafts and helicopters for striking the force, troop carrying and reconnaissance activities. The South African government has always kept social control in mind. And so with the planning of newly constructed urban dwellings this is evident through the layout of these housing projects because they are easily surveyed from the air, easily stalked from the ground, easily surrounded, and easily cut off from the urban environment. The South African military is responsible for the tight hold on power, and the regional adherence to its economic initiatives that would ultimately contribute to its growth as a regional power. South Africa reasons that it is now in a strong position to deal with the U.N. largely because the threat of UN-SA confrontation seems to be diminished. The West (most notably the U.S.) is not likely to approve of direct confrontation with South Africa. The African States, without massive assistance from one of these centers of power, are not able to sustain any serious military challenge. Therefore the South African regime during the apartheid era felt no tangible threat from external powers, but nevertheless continued its militarization to maintain the capability of its military force to give the regime prestige and power in the international community. It is for this reason that the South African regime pursued the development of its covert nuclear program. South African nuclear strategy has been acknowledged as the “three phase nuclear strategy” to deter potential adversaries and to compel Western involvement should deterrence fail. In the western world, it is also known as a finite deterrence. Phase one involved neither confirming nor denying its nuclear capability. In phase 2, if faced with imminent attack, Pretoria would reveal its capability to Western leaders to force their intervention. If that failed, phase 3 would involve overt nuclear testing to demonstrate South Africa 's ability and willingness to use nuclear weapons. In 1988, South Africa even took preliminary steps necessary to put phase 3 into effect when it clandestinely reopened one of the boreholes at the Kalahari test site (and built a metal concealment shed over the shaft) as part of a contingency plan to help bring an end to the Angolan war. An undeclared phase 4 plan comes from South Africa 's substantial investment in the development and production of intermediate-range ballistic missiles to be eventually fitted with nuclear warheads, and the completion in 1989 of the Advena nuclear warhead production facility. However, it is important to note that South Africa was the first state in the world to give up its nuclear weapons capability voluntarily. Not coincidentally, about the same time that the apartheid regime gave up it’s power, the regime gave up its nuclear ambitions. The new regime no longer felt a tangible security threat that would necessitate nuclear proliferation to protect its interests. When South Africa dismantled its advanced, but clandestine, nuclear weapons program and assumed a leading role in the nonproliferation regime. Western Europe held a monopoly on African colonialism and the revenue that it received through their colonial holdings prior to the Second World War. It controlled three quarters of Africa’s population in 1950 and economically benefited greatly from colonialism. Britain and Belgium gained the most, and their colonies’ dollar earning from exports to the United States greatly reduced Washington’s need to aid them directly. To give an idea of the revenue gained from African colonialism: “Africa’s exports to Europe in 1948 amounted to half as much as those from the United States. Its African possessions’ dollar surplus during the early 1950s paid for one-fourth of Britain’s imports from the United States.” The end of Empire gathered pace after Britain 's efforts during World War II left the country all but exhausted and found its former allies disinclined to support the colonial status quo. Economic crisis in 1947 made many realize that the Labor government of Clement Attlee should abandon Britain 's attempt to retain all of its overseas territories. The Empire was increasingly regarded as an unnecessary drain on public finances by politicians and civil servants, if not the general public. World War II fatally undermined Britain 's already weakened commercial and financial leadership and heightened the importance of the Dominions and the United States as a source of military assistance. Washington’s wartime economic planning was largely contingent on winning Britain to full cooperation with the United States aspirations. During WWII, the U.S. sought to control the Lend Lease policy so that, “Britain would emerge from the war neither rich enough to stand aloof from American economic pressures nor so weak as to be forced to impose an autarchic program of trade and currency restrictions.” The war devastated the British economy, causing England to become bankrupt in everything but name. The U.S. required British cooperation in order to pursue its economic policy but encountered delays by the British, “By mid-August, as the war against Japan was coming to an end, the discussions linking general postwar economic policy to a loan became acrimonious, even threatening.” The British financial problem is admittedly the greatest present barrier to rapid progress towards free multilateral payments and relation of barriers to trade…it threatens not only delay but, indeed, the ultimate success of our economic foreign program. Once the Truman administration exhausted its patience with the British diplomats, “On August 21st, Truman terminated all Lend Lease aid to Britain, in order to pressure them to take out a substantial loan and cooperate with American post-war plans.” Under the stipulations of the loan: Britain had to cut their import restrictions sharply for the U.S., they had to ensure that they would not place a import ceiling, and would have to wait a year for the free convertibility of all sterling for current transactions into any currency. The loan discussion was only the first of many steps during the months following the war in which the United States “…transferred to its own jurisdiction the obligations, and privileges, of British imperial power.” This would ultimately place the United States as South Africa’s protector, and supporting power. “Rapid decolonization of the British and French empires risked not only weakening the economic reconstruction of Western Europe… but also opening the door to instability from which Communists might profit.” As a result of this perceived threat, a trend in supporting a U.S. foreign policy towards South Africa evolved out of necessity. Washington did not introduce a single fundamental policy innovation toward Africa throughout this decade (1950s), and not until 1958 did the State Department create an assistant secretary ship devoted exclusively to this vast continent. The Eisenhower Administration adopted wholeheartedly its predecessor’s policy of opposing political independence, favoring the use of African resources to strengthen Western Europe’s recovery, and asking in return only an Open Door for the relatively modest American business interests involved there.” Policies towards the SA by the U.S. can be separated into four distinct policy postures: benign neglect, containment-confrontation, containment-crisis management, and accommodation. Policies of Limited Engagement were characterized by the post WWII period leading up to 1975. During this period, each presidential administration maintained good relations with the minority-controlled regimes in Southern Africa, while at the same time expressing in general terms, American abhorrence of apartheid and colonialism. During this period, the United States actions and policy taken towards South Africa were not meant to restructure the political system in the region. From 1973 until 1976, the containments policies characterized the Nixon administration’s relations with southern Africa. Three significant events during this period negated the factors that were the foundation for the policy of benign neglect. The first event was the OPEC-orchestrated rise in petroleum prices in 1973 and relatedly the successful oil boycott launched by the Arab oil producing states during the Arab-Israeli war of the same year. These events identified the political and economic vulnerabilities of American import dependency increased the perceived importance, within U.S. national interests, of access to an array of industrially essential minerals. South Africa effectively possesses plentiful access to these minerals. The actions of the oil producing countries propelled the U.S. to change it’s outlook on the region and policy towards South Africa from minimal to vital. The interaction of these two factors and increased instability in Angola caused the United States to transform its involvement in the region in order to protect its strategic and economic interests. The Carter administration was noted for both its regionalist and globalist tendencies that would in due course undermine the credibility and longevity of the accommodationist policy towards South Africa. It prevented the emergence of a coherent justification for such a policy. Without a clear and forcefully articulated rationale to support it, the policy of accommodation was a vulnerable target to attacks during the 1980 presidential election campaign. This administration briefly continued its predecessor’s policy as a benevolent friend towards the South African regime, but was known for its overt alignment with the states of sub-Saharan Africa. The Reagan administration appeared to be a sharp turn in United States policy. The administration defined southern Africa as a region in which the activity of the Soviet Union threatened vital strategic and economic interests of the United States, and in which Soviet advances during the past half decade have undermined the stature of the US as a global power. It temporarily indicated that the impact of regional events on the East-West power balance will be primary consideration in shaping its policy. The formation of a U.S. military-strategic stake in Southern Africa, primarily, a concern with possible Soviet access to naval bases in the area. Since the supertankers carrying the bulk of Western petroleum imports from the Persian Gulf are too large to navigate the Suez Canal, most of the oil bound for Europe and the U.S. travels south through the Indian Ocean, passing around the Cape of Good Hope into the Atlantic. Therefore, Soviet access to basing rights in the region is viewed as giving the Soviets the military means to rapidly apply an economic stranglehold on the Western alliance. U.S. experiences with South Africa and the regional political system has demonstrated that only by accepting a complex and variegated notion of U.S.-Soviet relations can the United States hope to connect its policies with the pluralistic reality of regional politics and thereby maintain and expand upon its own interests. The Soviets are well aware of the Western vulnerability to minerals, but were not interested in escalating a racial conflict or guerilla wars in the region that could easily turn into a nuclear confrontation with the United States. The impact of communism in communist countries has been to display a strong commitment to the eradication of colonial rule and of white-minority governments in the area, and have supported local entities that seek to accomplish the same goals. Their respective involvements in this cause have subsequently generated new resolve on the part of such local groups to press their cases and have stimulated a sense of urgency on the part of many outside powers and even of previous defenders of status quo to bring about some sort of accommodation to these issues. Communism has had only adverse affects in relation to the regional economies, promoting various armed uprisings that has disrupted a number of economies. Communist states have made its strongest impact in the military domain of southern Africa, and consequently South Africa. They have had a major hand in escalating militarization of the region. In 1974-1948, the flow of arms from outside sources to the black-run governments of the area rose significantly over that of earlier years, reaching a total of $1,065 million. The Soviet Union and China provided roughly $605 million, with the Soviets accounting for 95 percent of this amount. The Communist countries have also displaced the Western countries as the main source of arms for black elements in the area. Although an indirect impact of communist presence in the region, the most telling evidence of the communist effect in southern Africa was the military preparedness of South Africa and the size of the military buildup in the country since the mid-1970s. Between 1974 and 1980, the SADF managed to almost double its forces from 47,450 to 86,050 soldiers. The SADF was both westernized and modernized to withstand any threat short of a super power intervention, and would ultimately enforce the apartheid policies until its disbanding. With the help of the United States, South Africa could better pursue regional initiatives that would strengthen its influence in the region. One such initiative was known as the ‘outward-looking policy’. The outward-looking policy was a culmination of the coming independence of black African states, South Africa’s belated perception of this eventuality, South Africa’s industrial growth, the realization that the High Commission Territories would never be formally signed over to an apartheid government, and the development of the implementation of the philosophy of apartheid to its logical although not necessarily sensible conclusion that helped lead to new initiatives and responses in South Africa’s policies. South Africa is a status quo power. Its chief desire is to maintain and reinforce the power of the white population in relation to the non-white in order to secure its survival. As a result, short-range aim in foreign policy has become a characteristic of South African politics. During the attempt to foster the ‘apparently’ mutually beneficial relations between SA and other black African states, SA policy stressed regional security, stability, cooperation and economic growth. South Africa avoided formalizing relationships in effort to avoid precipitating resistance to interaction. The official rational for outward-looking policy can be broken down to: a growing sense of isolation, the need for a dynamic approach to the status quo, frustrated idealism, a self-image as a regional power, particularly in economic terms, and military and non-military strategic considerations. The rationalizations for outward-looking policy have a long history in South African political rhetoric. The rational for this policy has a general appeal with several increasingly important groups in SA society; the young, the urban, the urbane, the affluent, and those conscious of attitudes abroad and those interested in projecting an image of a progressive, dynamic, developing South Africa. South African politicians felt that eventually the High Commission Territories and South West Africa would be integrated into the Union of South Africa. Therefore, a proprietary attitude developed a culturally European state that sought to bring the region under its control. This attitude influenced the direction of South Africa’s political institution’s development and subsequently brought a pursuit of regional hegemony. Due to the influence and power of the colonial powers, South Africa’s initiate attempts at establishing regional hegemony were unsuccessful. Therefore the South African initiative changed its approach towards attaining its goal by placing a greater emphasis on extending other forms of South African influence more widely through the region. While pursuing a policy of regional hegemony, the white-minority South African government continued to follow the policy of maintaining British colonial rule and began to pursue a policy of deterring African nationalism. Both of these policies gained importance leading up to its break from the Common Wealth. Minimal cooperation and peaceful relations between the non-white states and SA was required for mutually beneficial relations to even begin to form in Sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore the South African government pushed to form these ties through diplomatic relations, doctrines and the external pressure of superpowers. Doctrines and policy papers published regarding the ‘outward-looking policy’ began to appear in 1957, and were both ideological and naive.

“We cannot assume that the non-white countries which become independent are or must be necessarily our enemies. We shall have to move in the direction that will enable us and them to exist on a friendly basis in Africa. In the normal course of events… it will develop that between us and especially the countries south of the Sahara… points of contact will have to come and in the course of time normal and even diplomatic relations will have to come.”

When given opportunities to implement these ideas, they were not taken by the government. For example in 1957 Ghana gained independence and sought to establish relations with South Africa that could have developed further. This Ghanaian initiative was unsuccessful primarily because the South African government was not prepared to change policy in the important and sensitive field of race relations by way of foreign policy. In policy and in practice, South Africa pursued the outward-looking policy through its propaganda and reactions to regional developments similar to that of the Soviet Union in relation to the Eastern bloc states. In various speeches, Dr. Verwoerd and other South African politicians expressed the Balkanization theory of quasi-colonial rule by referring to the Bantu lands as, “…our Bantu areas.” The decolonization of southern Africa presented a number of opportunities for South Africa to exploit the quasi-independence of the Bantustans and their dealing with independent black states. We can conclude that the outward policy is essentially an extension and reformulation of an old defensive line, prompted by an acute need for markets for industrial products and investment capital. South African officials identified that apartheid could be strengthened domestically by dealing with black-governed neighboring states. The coalescence of the white oligarchy, the economic growth and high-cost industrial expansion of South Africa, and the need to adjust foreign policy to the realities of African independence has stimulated the outward-looking policy. In analyzing South African Foreign policy patterns, we can see strategies that imitate those of other regional powers. These policies can typically be labeled as adaptation, symbiosis, isolation, penetration, and intervention. Adaptation causes the state to alter its external behavior and possibly its internal structure so that it can survive in a changed or hostile environment. A symbiotic relationship involves a mutually advantageous co-existance in which one state usually perceives the possibilities and profitability of this sort of arrangement first, and then seeks to convince its potential partner of the efficacy of this policy while at the same time attempting to ensnare it in its sphere of influence. States may seek to deal with regional conflict or tension by a policy of isolation. In theory it is a conscious effort to resolve a conflict situation by physically sealing off the actor regarded as the cause of the problem. This can be done through: sanctions and boycotts in immigration, trade, communications, and diplomacy. This was the initial response of South Africa to impending black independence. The black African states cannot pursue this option, as they are vulnerable and have formed too many links with the white-ruled states, before independence and since. Penetration calls for the intentionally cover and non-violent efforts to induce changes in particular policies on the part of another government without attempting to alter the government itself. While this has been a policy regularly used by South Africa, regional black states have been unable to secure the leverage necessary to employ penetration successfully. Penetration could easily develop into intervention, if exposed or reacted too vigorously. Intervention refers to “organized and systematic activities across recognized boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority structure of the target.” This behavior can be considered either revolutionary, designed to replace existing structures; or conservative, to strengthen existing structures regarded as unstable. South Africa has employed the latter strategy in its attempt to maintain a hold on power through the apartheid and separate development strategies. Companies that answered a UN survey taken in the 1980s indicated that they intended to maintain or increase their investment in South Africa. The primary motivation in continuing operation in South Africa was given to profitability and market demand. U.S. companies had a particular interest in investing in the South African market as the rates of return were above the average elsewhere. For example, in 1980 the rate of return was 29%, while abroad elsewhere it was 18.4%. High growth in market demand stimulated the increased involvement of transnational corporations in various sectors of the economy.

“In the transportation sector, growth in the market demand in the early 80s spurred a series of investments by transnational corporations (including companies such as Volkswagenwerk AG (Federal Republic of Germany), Daimler Benz AG (Federal Republic of Germany), Dunlop PLC (United Kingdom), IMI PLC (United Kingdom), Maremont Corporation (United States), Ford Motor Company (United States), BMW AG (Federal Republic of Germany), GM motors (United States) ).” In order to help maintain the growth of their respective markets and to contribute to the stability of the state, transnational corporations have been involved in governmental programs undertaken to achieve the South African goal of self-sufficiency in some strategic sectors of the economy. On a short or intermediate-term basis, most companies appear to feel that the risks of doing business in South Africa are no greater and perhaps even less than those of doing business in many other countries in the world. The willingness of corporations to invest and the perception of safety in the region has proved the success of the government in creating an attractive environment for direct foreign investment that ultimately has resulted in a reciprocal relationship in which the investors support government incentives for self-sufficiency. This in turn, has demonstrated South Africa’s economic strength that has ultimately allowed it to overshadow its regional neighbors. Following the collapse of the apartheid regime, civil chaos and political instability was an immediate effect of the culmination of the resistance movement and the apartheid legacy. As a result, extreme conditions of militarization, political intolerance, mass detention and security legislation, disobedience and defiance of political authority, denial of national identity and responsibility, racial injustice, hatred and suspicion have continued to haunt the new political order. This reality can be seen from the intensification of political violence that engulfed the country after 1987, and assumed new proportions during the first four years of the 1990s, increasing as the election approached. Explanations have been given for this ‘increase’ in violence, one of which is due to the intense ideological rivalry between the African National Congress (ANC) and the Ikatha Freedom Party (IFP) and competition between the different sections of the deprived communities for limited resources and infrastructure. In efforts to maintain political stability in 1990, the South African government had to face several interconnected issues. Political instability and unrest that was fueled by the anti-apartheid movement led to economic and political isolation by the international community. As a result, South Africa’s access to capital and technology was blocked off, which then created an economic recession. This vicious cycle created a great pressure on the South African apartheid regime. In the time of political instability the regime lost both its cohesiveness and its legitimacy. Its constant political shifting between policies, and its inability to eliminate opponents of the state severely weakened its authority and legitimacy. The regime lost its legitimacy and since no regime can last without support and consent, it disintegrates. Every system of authoritarian rule attempts to establish and to cultivate the belief in its legitimacy. The loss of legitimacy does not necessarily mean that the regime will automatically cede its power and begin democratization. Rather it is when the regime loses legitimacy in the civil society and there is mass unrest or mass noncompliance that liberalization occurs. South Africa met all of these conditions and when the white minority saw that the apartheid regime could no longer protect its interests, it pressured the government to act. Foreign pressures are ultimately the cause of the collapse of the apartheid regime. The most pervasive effect that the apartheid legacy had on South Africa was the paralysis of the political consensus, and as a result the miss-management of a state collapse that would result in the incomplete or staggered transition into democracy. President de Klerk and NP repealed apartheid laws in 1990, in South Africa. Black Africans were now allowed to move freely, and the resulting freedoms led to an upsurge of crime (which can be seen as a release of the pain and anguish of the repressed black majority). On February 2nd of 1990, Mandela was liberated and the ANC was un banned.
White people were the main targets of the crimes, being brutally assaulted, robbed or killed. Morale of the SADF(South African Defense Force) and local police organization descended to an all-time low. A large portion of both forces retired their posts, which resulted in a training period of only six weeks. It did not help that recruits had to be constantly reminded that they were legal targets for any brutality that would come about from the South African citizenry.
The police or ‘agents of the state’, were seen to collaborate in the perpetuation of violence in these communities. As a result, people lost the little confidence they had in the South African legal system. Because of the racial and political situation, the majority of local criminals were deliberately not apprehended and as a result communities generally adopted a cynical attitude toward reporting most crimes and thefts. Communities were told by police officials that they would not intervene because the criminals were supporters of an organization like the ANC. Examples of this attitude were seen in the release of local criminals that upon returning to the community formed gangs that would murder, steal, and rape.
The immediate result of violence can be seen as evidence of the colonial and apartheid legacy manifesting itself. The crime increase that followed the apartheid repeal has stayed an issue for the government, as it has created severe trust issues between the voter and the government in power. This is a significant problem, as legitimacy requires trust from the people, and with a lack of it, the validity of the ‘democratic’ South African state and its future developments must be questioned.
The planners of the transition of the government sought to create a weakened central authority that would not threaten white interests in the socioeconomic sphere of South Africa. The National Party were the engineers of this transitional government, and set up two basic principles: the first being that South Africa is a state in which all people regardless of race have full and equal access to the government, and the second that it should be a weak state, highly constrained in its ability to pursue major alterations in the economic and social system. The white minority sought to maintain these white interests by the elections being held via racially specific political groups, in order to significantly weaken black power following the elections. The white minority neglected to take into account the organization and commitment of the ANC and the black resistance movement.
After the constitutions adoption, plans proceeded for elections on April 26th, 1994. In anticipation of this election, ANC started a registration drive in March of 1993. Due to the political unrest and violence in KwaZulu-Natal in March of 1994, President de Klerk declared a state of emergency. The cause of the violence had been the fact that Chief Buthelezi demanded that a constitutional amendment that secured the position of King Goodwill Zwelithini and the historic Zulu kingdom. The root of the problem was in passifying Buthelezi and the materialistic greed of the Zulu contingency. A week before the elections, the Zulus halted their demands and political unrest in exchange for the continued status of the monarchy and the kingdom of KwaZuluNatal. However, it is important to note that a month after the elections more than a million acres of KwaZulu-Natal land was promised to Zwelithini and Buthelezi had become Minister of Home Affairs in the expected new government lead by Mandela.
Illiteracy was and is a major problem for South Africa. To ensure the greatest representation in the election, it was decided that the pictures of the leaders of each party would be listed above that choice in the ballot. The result saw over 70% of the registered voters participating in the elections.
The results found that the ANC secured a majority of Assembly seats, while the National Party and the Inkatha Freedom party found their support more localized in Western Cape Province and KwaZulu-Natal. The National party did will among Colored and Asiatic Indian voters. The Freedom Front did well in areas dominated by rural whites. This is significant because the transition was successful, and rarely does it happen that a ruling power will give up its position to a disenfranchised section of the population.
Mandela’s moral authority and legitimacy was so powerful that he could play to moderate policies and ignore more outrageous demands from differing former anti-apartheid allies. This is important, because Mandela’s popularity and legitimacy would allow for political consolidation of the ANC and a smooth succession to the next leader.
The Constitution Commission completed its work on May 1996. One notable provision paves the way for the purchase and transfer of land back to black Africans. However there is a clause that calls for market-based compensation (which ironically the government cannot afford). The Senate was changed to a Provincial Council of premiers of the nine provinces and others chosen provincially. “The South African constitution continues the structure of government without change – maintaining a strong central authority, with the powers of provinces and smaller areas being strictly limited.” The constitution therefore, is a means for the South African leaders and the ANC to dominate the political sphere in their nation.
Mbeki’s rise to power marked a change in the way the ANC dealt with South Africa’s white minority. Mandela triggered this shift in his valedictory speech to the 1997 ANC party conference. This speech (reportedly prepared by Mbeki) departed from the soothing rhetoric of multiracialism that had eased the transition to majority rule. Whites had ‘demonstrated consistently’ a desire to cling to the privileges they enjoyed under apartheid, he said. It was a crucial step in preparing the policy change that Mbeki would bring about with his presidency that would see a re-occurring theme of using “racist” as a political charge brought against both white and black critics of his policies. This type of ‘regression’ would ultimately make it more difficult for the ANC to transition into a political party however it would prove to be a policy that would help Mbeki consolidate power.
The ANC found that being the party of power was much different than being the opposition party, and so it changed in its dealings with its two primary allies (COSATU- Congress of South African Trade Unions and SACP the South African Communist Party). When making political decisions it did not consult either ally in its action, but rather it informed them of its decision. These are not democratic tendencies but rather tendencies of an authoritarian power.
Mbeki’s presidency brought about a new phase in South African politics, from Mandela’s soft-spoken moral authority to a soft authoritarian based consolidated “democracy”. To ensure the progression and avoid social injustices of the past, the government passed the Promotion of Access to Information Bill, the Promotion of Administrative Justice Bill, the Preferential Procurement Policy Framework and the Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Bill in 2000. The effective implementation of these laws will depend on budgetary allocations. Yet another problem is the ambiguities found in the laws that may delay their full implementation.
Leading up to the 2004 elections, the ‘democratic traditions’ of the ANC have waned. Following the 1994 elections, the national executive committee conducted lively debates on important issues, but its ultimate authority has been eclipsed by a concentration of effective power in an increasingly autocratic executive. A perfect example of this dominance would be sending an entire aircraft filled with weapons to rescue a stranded Jean-Bertrand Aristide in Haiti. This decision was completely single handed, personal, and illustrative of the system’s executive dominance.
The 2004 election results brought yet another victory for the ANC with 70% of the vote, confirming the two-thirds majority in parliament. This victory also assured his election to a second four-year term as a president by the National Assembly. The DA (without the NNP) won 50 seats, while the IFP won a mere 28 seats. The NNP only won 9 seats, as its alliance with the ANC destroyed all of its credibility.
The ANC’s electoral victory has confirmed its dominance of South Africa’s political sphere. It secured a majority in all but two provinces, Western Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, but in each it became the dominant party due to its political alliances. Therefore Mbeki was able to assert ANC party members without consulting his allies with impunity in all nine provinces. Surprisingly, four of the nine ANC premiers would be women. Putting women in the spots may simply be a ploy by Mbeki and the ANC to curry favor with the West, and put up a façade of democratization.
The apartheid regime conditioned the political culture of South Africa to find political violence, confrontation, defiance of authority, mass boycotts, political intolerance, deep-seated distrust, and racial hatred as a norm. It created decades of political oppression and economic deprivation. Bureaucratic authoritarianism would be the true institutional legacy left behind for the governments that followed. A soft form of bureaucratic authoritarianism can already be seen evolving in South Africa with the overwhelming power of the ANC and of the executive candidate (Mbeki) of their choosing in place. Apart from the sociological effects of the apartheid system, which has always been held responsible for the high rate of crime in black communities, the intensification of political violence generated its own momentum in the area of crime. Communities were coerced, without the authority of any political leadership, to pay “protection fees” for defense against attacks by alleged political rivalries. This increased burden on the impoverished communities was coupled with an increasing rate of theft of furniture and other valuable personal belongings. Apartheid brought about several negative effects on the economic and social spheres of South African society, however most of these effects were a result of the under education of black South Africans. Since 1994, the ANC has spent over a quarter of the budget on education. However the problem is that most of that spending goes towards paying teachers, most of which are poorly trained and do not perform well in classrooms. Combined with weak local governance, the resulting combination brings a significant amount of under skilled graduates that contribute to the growing unemployment rate and shortage of skilled labor. South Africa’s current economic situation has created a two-tiered economy; one rivaling other developed countries and the other with only the most basic infrastructure. It therefore is a productive and industrialized economy that exhibits many characteristics associated with developing countries, including a division of labor between formal and informal sectors--and uneven distribution of wealth and income. The formal sector, based on mining, manufacturing, services, and agriculture, is well developed. South Africa is the world 's largest producer and exporter of gold and platinum and also exports a significant amount of coal. During 2000, platinum overtook gold as South Africa 's largest foreign exchange earner. The value-added processing of minerals to produce ferroalloys, stainless steels, and similar products is a major industry and an important growth area. The country 's diverse manufacturing industry is a world leader in several specialized sectors, including railway rolling stock, synthetic fuels, and mining equipment and machinery. Although well over a century old, South Africa 's mining industry is far from fully tapped. The country is a treasure trove, with mineral deposits only matched by some countries of the former Soviet Union. South Africa has made great progress in dismantling its old economic system, which was based on import substitution, high tariffs and subsidies, anticompetitive behavior, and extensive government intervention in the economy. The new leadership has moved to reduce the government 's role in the economy and to promote private sector investment and competition. It has significantly reduced tariffs and export subsidies, loosened exchange controls, cut the secondary tax on corporate dividends, and improved enforcement of intellectual property laws. South Africa 's per capita GDP, corrected for purchasing power parity, positions the country as one of the 50 wealthiest in the world. President Thabo Mbeki vowed to promote economic growth and foreign investment by relaxing restrictive labour laws, stepping up the pace of privatization, and cutting unneeded governmental spending. It is estimated that South Africa accounts for up to 30% of the gross domestic product of the entire African continent. South Africa is also the continent 's largest energy producer and consumer. South Africa’s economic command demonstrates more than necessary its dominance over the region, and its potential to continue as a regional economic hegemony. In recent years, the SANDF has become a major peacekeeping force in Africa, and has been involved in operations in Lesotho, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and Burundi, amongst others. It has also participated as a part of multi-national UN peacekeeping forces. Since 1994, the South African military has undergone a large-scale transformation process, not merely in terms of the race and gender of its personnel, but also its relationship with the civilian government, its organizational culture, its role, and posture. Over the past decade, the 70,000-strong South African National Defense Force (SANDF) has been brought under civilian control, and parliament now has the power to approve the defense budget and to scrutinize decisions taken by the president to deploy military forces abroad. Although the South African military has undergone a transformation in the post-apartheid era, it has maintained its superiority as the regional power. The southern African regional political system is similar to the Eastern European regional political system in that the pattern of interaction is a series of bilateral arrangements between the center on one hand and the other regional states on the other. South Africa can, like the Soviet Union, dominate the regional political sphere. In structural as well as political and economic terms, South Africa has advantages over its neighbors. Primarily, there are few important multilateral relationships. This allows for greater flexibility in policy and pursuing its interests. Therefore, by serving as the institutional and communications center of the region, South Africa can maintain control of regional affairs and prevent or make difficult the collaboration of its neighbors against itself. “Regional relationships thus take on the pattern of a wheel with little if any institutionalized contact between states on the extremities of the spokes.” It is clear that South Africa is exceedingly more powerful, by a variety of economic indicators, then its black neighbors, and the resultant tensions, either real or imagined, precipitate and exacerbate many foreign policy issues. However this has led to South African encountering vast political resistance, economic sanctions as well as international condemnation. South Africa acted as an interventionist regional hegemon during the apartheid era but has been a reluctant hegemon since majority rule was established in 1994 and has often acted within a regional organization, the Southern African Development Community. South Africa is 85% of SADC in economic terms and that means 85% of the human capacity, 85% of the institutional capacity, 85% of the productive capacity. So what South Africa does and how the rest of the region works with South Africa is incredibly important. South Africa is obviously very important for regional stability in this region. None of the other elements of those peacekeeping forces are able to bring the mix of military capacity and political commitment and political skill that South Africa is able to bring. Several historical accounts of international relations in South Africa have generalized that South Africa is the dominating presence spanning the region. The economic might and geographical location allows for South Africa to overshadow the combined economic weight of its black-governed neighbors. As a result, South Africa attempts to utilize its economic and military power in an effort to maintain its own stability and security, and to achieve its regional political objectives. While South Africa has by far the most developed economy in Africa, its society remains deeply divided and its government faces huge socio-economic challenges in reversing the massive inequalities resulting from four decades of apartheid.
Pretoria’s apartheid era army’s destabilization of its neighbors has left a profound distrust of South African military interventionism which remains strong today. Pretoria continues to dominate the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) involving Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (Namibia joined on 4 April 1990), which came to be seen as “the rand zone”. South Africa’s exports to the region are more than eight times more than regional imports. Land-locked Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana have depended on South Africa’s ports. Despite their attempts at lessening their dependence on South Africa through the Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference (SADCC) during the 1980s, many of the sub-region’s states still traded covertly with, and depended on, South Africa. The fact that South Africa accounts for 80 percent of SADC’s economy and has a six to one favorable trade balance with its smaller neighbors breeds envy and resentment. In reaction to these concerns, Mbeki has consistently stressed that South Africa will engage the sub-region “as a partner and ally, not as a regional superpower”. In February 2000, South Africa established a $30 million African Renaissance and International Co-operation Fund to promote democracy, development and security in Africa. Throughout Africa, there is fear of the development of hegemonic sub regional states. Whenever one of the continent’s more powerful countries (South Africa, Nigeria, Egypt) appears to be taking an active interest in sub regional affairs, many of its smaller neighbors will try to combine to counterbalance what they see as its excessive power. In contrast to the U.S. or Japan, these larger states are not so economically powerful that their neighbors want to bandwagon with them. Integration between neighboring African states is usually the integration of unequal partners, and the benefits of the arrangement are often polarized towards one partner. For example South Africa is the major beneficiary of the Southern Africa Customs Union, and has therefore allowed compensatory mechanisms to be built in that benefit the other smaller members. Post-apartheid South Africa saw its task as not only re-establishing ties with the rest of Africa, but committing itself to the renewal of the continent through the deepening of economic ties, creating conditions for development, building an environment of peace and security, active participation in regional and continental institutions, and the development of policies and frameworks that would give substance to an envisaged African Renaissance. The government has operated with the ideological orientation that it is its “brother 's keeper” and that the growth and prosperity of South Africa is intimately intertwined with the development of Africa as a whole. South Africa 's leadership role has been recognized and hence it had been elected to chair the AU and the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).
South Africa’s government seeks to create: a growing economy that steadily reduces inequality, the progression of stable and predictable institutions, and a supportive political culture. However it cannot do so in its current condition. In order to progress towards true democratic liberalization, the government must amend the constitution to create a viable alternative to the soft-core authoritarian standard seen today. It must also solve the issue of literacy, by creating or importing a qualified teaching force. This would help solve the problem of unemployment, lack of skilled labor, poverty, and would encourage participation in the political system. Ultimately, solving the problem of education would lead to a better civil society, and could create a truly transparent and legitimate society.
Today’s South Africa is a paradox. In terms of political culture, South Africa’s society plays a key role in achieving democracy through its widespread opposition to the apartheid regime. The country’s numerous and diverse civil society organizations range from community grassroots groups to national trade unions and nongovernmental organizations. However the irony is that citizens are not particularly supportive of democratic rule and now display low levels of community and political participation. The west influenced the South African economy and so macroeconomic stability, fiscal discipline, and low inflation are now part of the economic characteristic. However the problem lies in the weak business confidence, stagnant growth, massive unemployment and rising intra-racial inequality due to the economic divide.
Politically, the paradox is seen in a constitution designed to promote multiparty competition and individual rights, only to find that one-party dominance and limited governmental accountability is the reality. Therefore, one can draw the conclusion that South Africa’s government is still in an uncertain state of transformation however the direction that the transformation takes is up to the policies of the Mbeki regime. Mbeki’s government may seem to be a democracy on paper, but in reality it is showing early signs of decay, and is hinting at a possible regression towards an authoritarian single-party state. By following the historical progression of the South African regime to present day, and the extraneous and internal influences one can conclude that the South African state has been able to maintain its position as the regional hegemon in Southern Africa.

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Alex Jankovsky
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Professor Lefebvre
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