Should Constitutional Conventions Be Regreted As A Law?

If ‘law’ is a system of ‘norms’ coded legal/illegal, to what extent can we regard ‘constitutional conventions’ as ‘law’? Is the distinction ‘law’/’non-law’ important here, given the central place of conventions within the UK constitutional order? Explain your reasons.
Jaconelli argues that there is...”a clear conceptual divide between laws and conventions”.1 This essay will discuss the extent to which this view is right given the central place of conventions within the UK constitutional order. The concept of constitutional conventions will be considered and compared to the ‘law’ taking into account issues of enforceability and the consequences of breaches. Throughout, it will be argued that constitutional conventions cannot be regarded as law although they do play an important part in the British Constitution.
If the ‘law’ is a system of ‘norms’ coded legal/illegal, in considering whether constitutional conventions are ‘law’, we must consider whether their definition fits this description.
An example of new legislation being passed after a breach of convention was shown in 1909 after the House of Lords continually rejected Lloyd George’s ‘People’s Budget’ passed by the Commons. The Parliament Act 1911 stopped the Lords’ right to veto money bills and gave legal authority to the convention. This fact somewhat answers the question in discussion; if legislation has to give effect to constitutional conventions to prevent them being breached, conventions cannot be regarded as the law. However, the fact that some conventions are given legal authority shows that constitutional conventions “...are often as important as rules of law and can sometimes be more important, judged by the consequences which could follow from the breach.”13 This is obviously evident from the above; if the law wasn’t amended and the Lords were able to keep vetoing money bills, there would have been a serious injustice to the