The defense centered its arguments on mere inconsistencies between the sworn statements and testimonies of the witnesses. The arguments raised were speculative rather deliberated, superficial rather substantive and illogical rather rational. The prosecution witnesses have positively, clearly and convincingly identified the accused Romulo Takad as the culprit who took the tricycle, in view of the following reasons:
First, Rule 113, Sec. 2 of the RULES OF EVIDENCE, categorically states that, in a criminal prosecution, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt. The Supreme Court held in People v. Sanchez, “Sworn statement/affidavits are generally subordinated in importance to open court declarations because the former are often executed when an affiant’s mental faculties are not in such a state as to afford him a fair opportunity of narrating in full the incident which has transpired. Thus, testimonial evidence carries more weight than sworn statements oraffidavits.”
The inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses do not eradicate the moral certainty which the witnesses have ascertained during the court proceeding. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of eyewitnesses on material details are straightforward and consistent with each other. Their combined declarations established beyond reasonable doubt the identity of Takad.
Second, when the defense presented the accused as one of its witnesses, the alibi raised by the accused that he was sleeping in their house in the morning of November 21, 2003 when the crime of carnapping happened, must not be given weight. In People vs. Larranaga (G.R. Nos 138874-75), the requirements of time and place must be established by clear and convincing evidence, that is, it was physically impossible to be at the place of the crime. Takad ,may, physically be at the place of the crime as both the new possessor and the accused lives in Pasig City wherein transportation is available 24 hours daily. In People vs. Sayoc, weak denial especially when uncorroborated, cannot overcome the positive identification of them by the prosecution witnesses. As between the positive declarations of the prosecution witnesses and negative statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence and weight.
Finally, there is no showing that the prosecution witnesses had to falsely testify against the accused. As a rule, absent any evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such motive exists, and their testimonies are thus worthy of full faith and credit.
The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were straightforward, cohesive, positive, and credible. Succinctly, the defense’s premises were spurious and unintelligible rather a product of wise, sound and logical deliberations and bears nothing but a nonentity!
QUESTIONS ON CREDIBILITY OF THE WITNESSES
Do you have in depth understanding of the precept of law under our Rules of Court particularly Art. 113 Sec 2 of the Rules of Evidence?
Does it mechanically eradicate possibility of errors? Yes or No?
Is proof beyond reasonable doubt construed to mean an absolute certainty and excludes all possibility of error? Yes or No?
Do you then say that the proof needed is absolute certainty? Yes or No!
Did you cite a legal support to negate the probative weight of positive identification vis-a vis alibi?
With due respect, dear colleague, your failure to grasp an understanding of the principle of proof beyond reasonable doubt fatally militates your case and this debate should be concluded in our favor! Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a degree of proof, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty.
Second Question: Will you agree with me that our jurisdiction is replete with...