Reasons for the Failure of the Wiemar Government

Modern Half Yearly Essay Revision 1. Failure of the Weimar
The failure of the Weimar Republic, as well as the subsequent rise of the Nazi Party, was the end result of a series of difficult political events that the Weimar Republic simply did not have the tools to defend against. The democratic government faced a significant uphill battle as it came into the unenviable job of attempting to the best by a nation angry about the war, and looking for an easy scapegoat, which the Republic provided them with, partly of their own making. Circumstantially, the Weimar Republic also had to deal with the harsh terms of the Treaty of Versailles. As well as this basic difficulty, in its time of rule the Weimar Republic had to negotiate with issues such as the Great Depression, which brought with it the economically cruelling protectionism policies of many foreign nations, compounding Germany’s financial struggles. All of these factors will be spoken about in this essay, as well as the intrinsically linked rise of the Nazi party, which put the final nail in the Weimar Republic’s metaphorical coffin.

The post-war peace settlement imposed harsh terms on Germany that generated intense political debate and division. Though the vast majority of Germans opposed the treaty, they were sharply divided about how to respond to it. Right-wing nationalist groups, like the NSDAP, demanded a refusal to acknowledge the treaty or to comply with its terms. The moderates and pragmatists rejected this approach, which would provoke economic strangulation and possibly war or invasion. Under the ministership of Gustav Stresemann, the government’s approach was to restore foreign relations and to work for a re-negotiation of Versailles and its punitive terms. Also stemming from the Treaty of Versailles was the issue of reparations. Historians have reached different conclusions about whether the final reparations figure was justified and the extent to which the exhausted German economy was capable of meeting this obligation. The general consensus is that the final amount was excessive; this hampered Germany’s post-war economic recovery and therefore its ability to stabilise politically. By 1922 Germany was unable to pay quarterly reparations instalments, triggering the Ruhr occupation, the hyperinflation crisis and the collapse of two government coalitions. While the official reparations were considerable, Germany ended up paying only a fraction of them. However, the reparations did damage Germany's economy by discouraging market loans, which forced the Weimar government to finance its deficit by printing more currency, causing rampant hyperinflation. Reparations remained a divisive issue for the duration of the Weimar Republic.
The Weimar Republic had some of the most serious economic problems ever experienced by any Western democracy in history. Rampant hyperinflation, massive unemployment, and a large drop in living standards were primary factors. From 1923–1929, there was a short period of economic recovery, but the Great Depression of the 1930s led to a worldwide recession. Germany was particularly affected because it depended heavily on American loans. In 1926, about 2 million Germans were unemployed—this rose to around 6 million in 1932. Many blamed the Weimar Republic. This was made apparent when political parties on both right and left wanting to disband the Republic altogether made any democratic majority in Parliament impossible. The Weimar Republic was severely affected by the Great Depression. The economic stagnation led to increased demands on Germany to repay the debts owed to the United States. As the Weimar Republic was very fragile in all its existence, the depression was devastating, and played a major role in the NSDAP's takeover.

The proportional voting system adopted in Weimar Germany was inherently democratic, in that it allocated Reichstag representation based on the share of votes that each party received. Proportional voting ruled out any prospect of majority government. It also filled the Reichstag with smaller parties, many of which had membership and policies that were wholly sectional or regional. The scattered composition of the Reichstag made maintaining and forming coalitions difficult and hindered the process of debating and passing legislation.

The economic collapse of 1929 had dire effects on Germany; by 1932, two-fifths of the German workforce was without a job. This resulted in many German voters abandoning their support for mainstream and moderate parties, to instead vote for radical groups. It is unclear how much of this was genuine support for these parties and how much was a protest vote – but whatever the reasons, the NSDAP recorded significant increases in Reichstag seats in 1930 and July 1932. This propelled HItler into the public eye, first as a presidential nominee and then as a potential chancellor. Without the miserable conditions created by this external event, Hitler and the NSDAP would likely have remained on the margins of Weimar politics.

Between 1924 and 1932, Hitler and his agents busied themselves with reforming and expanding the NSDAP. They’re- badged the NSDAP as a legitimate contender for Reichstag seats; toned down their anti-Semitic and anti-republican rhetoric; recruited members to increase party membership; and transformed the NSDAP into a national rather than a Bavarian party. Hitler also chased support from powerful interest groups: German industrialists, wealthy capitalists, press barons like Alfred Hugenberg and the upper echelons of the Reichswehr. Without these changes, Hitler and the NSDAP would not have been in a position to seek power in the early 1930s.

The knife through the heart of Weimar democracy came with the January 1933 appointment of Adolf Hitler as chancellor. Yet just a few months before, Hitler’s rise to power seemed unlikely. The man whose approval was required for Hitler to become chancellor, president Paul von Hindenburg, had a low regard for the NSDAP leader and no desire to appoint him as head of government. It took weeks of intriguing, rumour-mongering and lobbying before Hindenburg changed his mind. The actions of men like former chancellor Franz von Papen were a critical factor in persuading Hindenburg that a Hitler cabinet could succeed, yet could be controlled.