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No 39 December 2003
REDUCING HARM TO PATIENTS IN THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE. WILL THE GOVERNMENT’S COMPENSATION PROPOSALS HELP? Adrian Towse, Office of Health Economics Paul Fenn, Nottingham University Business School Alistair Gray, Health Economics Research Centre, Oxford University Neil Rickman, Department of Economics, Surrey University Rodrigo Salinas, ISPCH, Chile
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Introduction Defining error The size of the problem Government recommendations for change Our concerns about the proposed approach 2 3 3 5 8
result in injury or death. Some of these will be preventable and only a subset of these will be the result of negligence (or...
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