Personal Identity - Memory Theory vs Body Theory vs Soul Theory
Personal Identity REFERENCE: Perry, Dialogue on Personal Identity and Immortality.
. Thesis .
Identity refers to “a relation that everything has to itself and to no other thing”, and our perception of personal identity is the knowledge that we are ourselves, and who we have been – basically, that I am the same person I was last week, last year, etc. Leibniz’s Law states that if one thing (A) is identical to another (B) at one given point in time, they share the exact same properties, making them the same, one thing (A = B).
In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the arguments against the Memory Theory can be responded to adequately. In order to succeed in this task, I will explain the basis of the three aforementioned theories are, examine the Memory Theory’s main arguments, acknowledge and respond to the arguments against it and demonstrate that the Memory Theory is the theory closest to the truth. I have included visual diagrams of the important concepts presented in order to reiterate them.
. The Body Theory and The Soul Theory .
The Body Theory states that every person is identical with a living human body, that can be seen, touched, interacted with physically, etc, through the various senses. Our judgements of personal identity are usually justified on the basis of physical appearance (how they look) or behavioural similarity (how they act). I need to point out that the Body Theory is very widely accepted theory that most people have unknowingly committed themselves to believing. However, the logic behind this theory is unstable when attempting to identify when a living, human body begins and/or ceases to exist. The Soul Theory on the other hand, is considered to be very similar to the aforementioned Body Theory, except it states that every person is identical with an immaterial soul
. Thesis .
Identity refers to “a relation that everything has to itself and to no other thing”, and our perception of personal identity is the knowledge that we are ourselves, and who we have been – basically, that I am the same person I was last week, last year, etc. Leibniz’s Law states that if one thing (A) is identical to another (B) at one given point in time, they share the exact same properties, making them the same, one thing (A = B).
In this paper, I will argue that the Memory Theory of Personal Identity is the closest to the truth. I will do so by showing that the opposing theories – Body and Soul Theories – have evident flaws and that the arguments against the Memory Theory can be responded to adequately. In order to succeed in this task, I will explain the basis of the three aforementioned theories are, examine the Memory Theory’s main arguments, acknowledge and respond to the arguments against it and demonstrate that the Memory Theory is the theory closest to the truth. I have included visual diagrams of the important concepts presented in order to reiterate them.
. The Body Theory and The Soul Theory .
The Body Theory states that every person is identical with a living human body, that can be seen, touched, interacted with physically, etc, through the various senses. Our judgements of personal identity are usually justified on the basis of physical appearance (how they look) or behavioural similarity (how they act). I need to point out that the Body Theory is very widely accepted theory that most people have unknowingly committed themselves to believing. However, the logic behind this theory is unstable when attempting to identify when a living, human body begins and/or ceases to exist. The Soul Theory on the other hand, is considered to be very similar to the aforementioned Body Theory, except it states that every person is identical with an immaterial soul
References: Perry, J., 1977, 'A dialogue on personal identity and immortality '. Hackett Publishing. Shoemaker, S., 2008, '36 - Personal identity: a materialist account '. In Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell Publishing, Carlton, Australia (pp. 333-347). Swinburne, R., 2008, '39 - Personal identity: the dualist theory '. In Metaphysics: The Big Questions. Blackwell Publishing (pp. 368-384).