Joint attention/ social interest & vocabulary development
No. 3: Dawson et al 2004: early social attention impairments in ASD: including social orienting & joint attention i.e. joint attention No. 4: Laing 2002: atypical dev of language & social communication in toddlers with WS(effect of dydadic interactions) i.e. Joint attention No. 7: Ahktar & Gernsbacher 2007: Joint attention & vocabulary dev; critique that not necessary to have joint attention for voc dev: evidence from WS and ASD i.e. joint attention 15: Norbury et al : Word learning in Autistic disorders
Emotion processing- face processing- empathy- Alexithymia
No. 8: Riby & Hancock 2008: Diff between WS & ASD of viewing pattern of social scenes using eye tracking device (in ASD less attention time to faces while watching social scenes compared to WS) No. 9: Biby & Hancock 2009: Time to detect face between WS & ASD 10: Lacroix et al 2009: recognition of emotional & nonemtional facial expressions 12: Plesa_Skwerer et al 2006: to do with Alexithymia
13: Bird et al 2011: to do with Alexithymia
14: Silani et al 2008: levels of emotional awareness in ASD: v complicated study; fMRI; Also to do with Alexithymia 15: Heaton
16: Hill et al 2004
The theory of mind largely backed from research from Baron-Cohen (1995) contributes much to our current understanding of social interactive skills, allowing many researchers to build around this theory. Theory of mind (or mentalizing) relates to an umbrella term grounded in the ability to infer other’s mental states, which stretches to guessing others’ emotions, intentions, desires and imaginations (Baron-Cohen 1995). Baron-Cohen (1995) proposes that this cognitive mechanism causatively hinders the normative developmental trajectory for social interaction skills when it is lacking, hypothesised to be the case in individuals with Autism. Although currently considered a disorder with a spectrum of symptoms and severity, Autistic symptoms are largely to do with “mind-blindness” in social communication and interactions with other. There has been much research to support for this theory such as the use of the false-belief tasks (e.g. Leslie & Frith, 1985, in Klin, 2000) to test a child’s ability to infer another’s belief’s in a problem-solving situation. However research into other neurodevelopmental disorders has led to a more current belief that an impairment of theory of mind is not limited to Autism. Furthermore Klin (2000)- points out that theory of mind is such a large umbrella term, that for such a vast term should be broken down into two components including social-perceptual and social-cognitive skills aiding theory of mind skills (Tager-Flusberg et al, 2000).
This notion of producing a more broken-down theoretical model of theory of mind is supported by various studies. For instance it has been found that those with higher functioning Autism are able to pass false belief tasks despite their disabling lack of social comprehension skills in everyday life (Bowler 1992 in Klin, 2000), suggesting also that that the traditional theory of mind tests e.g. using false belief tasks, may not be appropriate for testing this highly heterogeneous disorder. Social-perceptual skills depend more on affective systems, and later reaching social-cognitive skills concern more complex inferences of meta-representations (Tager-Flusberg et al 2000). Also in Osterling, Dawson & Munson’s (2002) study, blind-raters were able to distinguish one year olds who went on to develop ASD, by observing specific social communication behaviours e.g. less gesturing, less attention to objects held by others. Therefore it may be deficits within social perceptual skills such as the lack of social orienting that may lead to the gain...