Opposing Argument: Abortion
Opposing Arguments: Abortion
Introduction:
Why abortion is immoral by Don Marquis is the start of two discussions pertaining to whether abortion should be acceptable in our modern society. The argument, Marquis makes, is that abortion actually deprives the fetus’s “future-like-ours.” Many philosophers support Marquis’ belief by arguing that fetuses have their own possibilities; thus, killing fetuses is absolutely wrong (Marquis, 105). Nevertheless, there are also other philosophers who criticize Marquis’ view in order to prove that abortion is not immoral since the fetus has no right to live. One of them is Peter K. McInerney, who wrote Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours? McInerney demonstrates the fact that fetuses have little or no relationship to their own future; therefore, the belief that “a fetus has a right to life” fails (Brill, 419). In addition, to support McInerney’s argument, H. Skott Brill’s The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity and the Twinning Dilemma provides us ideas along with different perspectives on why McInerney’s theory is a strong account against Marquis’s point of view on abortion. On the other hand, Marquis’s Brill’s Objection to the Future of Value Argument criticizes the conflicts between Brill’s premises in order to prove that his initial belief to abortion is consistently right. In this paper, I will present Brill’s and Marquis’s principal arguments and how they support their point of view.
The Future-Like-ours Argument, Personal Identity and the Twinning Dilemma
In the beginning of this article, H.Skott Brill summarizes the main idea of Why abortion is immoral by Don Marquis. The main idea is “if a fetus has a right to life then nearly all abortion are immoral” (Brill, 419). However, it does not mean that stopping “the means necessary for the continuation of the fetus life” is wrong (419). Brill continues providing the support for McInerney’s “personal identity objection” and addressing the issue of a fetus
Introduction:
Why abortion is immoral by Don Marquis is the start of two discussions pertaining to whether abortion should be acceptable in our modern society. The argument, Marquis makes, is that abortion actually deprives the fetus’s “future-like-ours.” Many philosophers support Marquis’ belief by arguing that fetuses have their own possibilities; thus, killing fetuses is absolutely wrong (Marquis, 105). Nevertheless, there are also other philosophers who criticize Marquis’ view in order to prove that abortion is not immoral since the fetus has no right to live. One of them is Peter K. McInerney, who wrote Does a Fetus Already Have a Future-Like-Ours? McInerney demonstrates the fact that fetuses have little or no relationship to their own future; therefore, the belief that “a fetus has a right to life” fails (Brill, 419). In addition, to support McInerney’s argument, H. Skott Brill’s The Future-Like-Ours Argument, Personal Identity and the Twinning Dilemma provides us ideas along with different perspectives on why McInerney’s theory is a strong account against Marquis’s point of view on abortion. On the other hand, Marquis’s Brill’s Objection to the Future of Value Argument criticizes the conflicts between Brill’s premises in order to prove that his initial belief to abortion is consistently right. In this paper, I will present Brill’s and Marquis’s principal arguments and how they support their point of view.
The Future-Like-ours Argument, Personal Identity and the Twinning Dilemma
In the beginning of this article, H.Skott Brill summarizes the main idea of Why abortion is immoral by Don Marquis. The main idea is “if a fetus has a right to life then nearly all abortion are immoral” (Brill, 419). However, it does not mean that stopping “the means necessary for the continuation of the fetus life” is wrong (419). Brill continues providing the support for McInerney’s “personal identity objection” and addressing the issue of a fetus
Cited: Brill, H. Skott. "The Future-like-ours Argument, Personal Identity, and the Twinning Dilemma." Social Theory and Practice 1 July 2003: 419-30. Print. Marquis, Don. "Brill 's Objections to the Future of Value Argument." Social Theory and Practice 1 Jan. 2005: 105-14. Print.