On The Folly Of Rewarding A While Hoping For B
On the Folly of Rewarding A, While Hoping for B
Author(s): Steven Kerr
Source: The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), pp. 769-783
Published by: Academy of Management
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/255378 .
Accessed: 16/01/2015 14:07
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On
the
of
Folly
A,
Rewarding
While
Hopig
for
B
STEVEN KERR
Ohio StateUniversity
Illustrations are presented from society in general, and from organizations in particular, of reward systems that
"pay off" for one behavior even though the rewarder hopes dearly for another. Portions of the reward systems of a manufacturing company and an insurance firm are examined and the consequences discussed.
Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. The extent to which this occurs of course will depend on the perceived attractiveness of the rewardsoffered, but neither operant nor expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion.
Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems
Author(s): Steven Kerr
Source: The Academy of Management Journal, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Dec., 1975), pp. 769-783
Published by: Academy of Management
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/255378 .
Accessed: 16/01/2015 14:07
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp .
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
.
Academy of Management is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Academy of Management Journal.
http://www.jstor.org
This content downloaded from 129.210.6.137 on Fri, 16 Jan 2015 14:07:43 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
On
the
of
Folly
A,
Rewarding
While
Hopig
for
B
STEVEN KERR
Ohio StateUniversity
Illustrations are presented from society in general, and from organizations in particular, of reward systems that
"pay off" for one behavior even though the rewarder hopes dearly for another. Portions of the reward systems of a manufacturing company and an insurance firm are examined and the consequences discussed.
Whether dealing with monkeys, rats, or human beings, it is hardly controversial to state that most organisms seek information concerning what activities are rewarded, and then seek to do (or at least pretend to do) those things, often to the virtual exclusion of activities not rewarded. The extent to which this occurs of course will depend on the perceived attractiveness of the rewardsoffered, but neither operant nor expectancy theorists would quarrel with the essence of this notion.
Nevertheless, numerous examples exist of reward systems
References: 1. Barnard,Chester I. The Functions of the Executive (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964). 2. Blau, Peter M., and W. Richard Scott. Formal Organizations(San Francisco: Chandler, 1962). 5. Kerr, Steven. "Some Modifications in MBO as an OD Strategy,"Academy of Management Proceedings, 1973, pp. 39-42. 6. Kerr, Steven. "What Price Objectivity?"American Sociologist, Vol. 8 (1973), 92-93. 7. Litwin, G. H., and R. A. Stringer, Jr. Motivation and Organizational Climate (Boston: HarvardUniversity Press, 1968). Ill.: Irwin, 1965). 10. Simon, Herbert A. AdministrativeBehavior (New York: Free Press, 1957). Journal of Sociology, Vol. 78 (1972), 702-705. Relations Center, McGill University, 1964).