Negative Impact

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  • Topic: Denial-of-service attack, Stateful firewall, Denial-of-service attacks
  • Pages : 7 (2005 words )
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  • Published : December 26, 2012
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Joseph Al Alam CCM455 -------------------------------------------------

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Man-in-the-middle attack

The man-in-the-middle attack (often abbreviated MITM, MitM, MIM, MiM, also known as a bucket brigade attack, or sometimes Janus attack) in cryptography and computer security is a form of active eavesdropping in which the attacker makes independent connections with the victims and relays messages between them, making them believe that they are talking directly to each other over a private connection, when in fact the entire conversation is controlled by the attacker. The attacker must be able to intercept all messages going between the two victims and inject new ones, which is straightforward in many circumstances (for example, an attacker within reception range of an unencrypted Wi-Fi wireless access point, can insert himself as a man-in-the-middle).[citation needed] A man-in-the-middle attack can succeed only when the attacker can impersonate each endpoint to the satisfaction of the other — it is an attack on mutual authentication (or lack thereof). Most cryptographic protocols include some form of endpoint authentication specifically to prevent MITM attacks. For example, SSL can authenticate one or both parties using a mutually trusted certification authority. -------------------------------------------------

Example of an attack

Illustration of man-in-the-middle attack.
Suppose Alice wishes to communicate with Bob. Meanwhile, Mallory wishes to intercept the conversation to eavesdrop and possibly deliver a false message to Bob. First, Alice asks Bob for his public key. If Bob sends his public key to Alice, but Mallory is able to intercept it, a man-in-the-middle attack can begin. Mallory sends a forged message to Alice that claims to be from Bob, but instead includes Mallory's public key. Alice, believing this public key to be Bob's, encrypts her message with Mallory's key and sends the enciphered message back to Bob. Mallory again intercepts, deciphers the message using her private key, possibly alters it if she wants, and re-enciphers it using the public key Bob originally sent to Alice. When Bob receives the newly enciphered message, he believes it came from Alice. 1. Alice sends a message to Bob, which is intercepted by Mallory: -------------------------------------------------

Alice "Hi Bob, it's Alice. Give me your key"--> Mallory Bob 2. Mallory relays this message to Bob; Bob cannot tell it is not really from Alice: -------------------------------------------------

Alice Mallory "Hi Bob, it's Alice. Give me your key"--> Bob 3. Bob responds with his encryption key:
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Alice Mallory <--[Bob's_key] Bob
4. Mallory replaces Bob's key with her own, and relays this to Alice, claiming that it is Bob's key: -------------------------------------------------
Alice <--[Mallory's_key] Mallory Bob
5. Alice encrypts a message with what she believes to be Bob's key, thinking that only Bob can read it: -------------------------------------------------
Alice "Meet me at the bus stop!"[encrypted with Mallory's key]--> Mallory Bob 6. However, because it was actually encrypted with Mallory's key, Mallory can decrypt it, read it, modify it (if desired), re-encrypt with Bob's key, and forward it to Bob: -------------------------------------------------

Alice Mallory "Meet me at 22nd Ave!"[encrypted with Bob's key]--> Bob 7. Bob thinks that this message is a secure communication from Alice. This example shows the need for Alice and Bob to have some way to ensure that they are truly using each other's public keys, rather than the public key of an attacker. Otherwise, such attacks are generally...
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