Running Head: WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?
“What Is It Like To Be A Bat?”
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WHAT IS IT LIKE TO BE A BAT?
Why is "consciousness" really tough to physical and mental problems, according to Thomas Nagel? Thomas Nagel claims that consciousness is the obstacle to the physical and mental problems. He said there is a little comprehension of consciousness by the reductionist, less available because there is no real convincing, incredible psychological account has been developed to help describe the familiar reductions (Nagel, 1998, 3-30). This leads reductionist to neglect the awareness of consciousness. However, according to Nagel, sense of physical and mental problems is boring without consciousness. Nagel now describes the conscious experience. He found that some animals and aliens have it and that there is something it is like to be that organism. He calls this "the main character of the experience" (Searle will call this "first person ontology" consciousness), and claims it has yet to be restored by reductionist, functional states, national or intentional acts of behaviour (Nagel, 1974, 436). An analysis of physical and mental awareness must include consciousness or some idea of it from the beginning of the work. He then compared the objective and subjective experience. The problem he discovered to reduce the latter is that it is connected to a single point of view. To make things not weird, Nagel attempted to analyze this case on bats (who are relatively close related to us, but still a bit different). Because their views and are so different from us, Nagel sees every reason to claim that we cannot imagine what it is like to be a bat (Nagel, 1998, 3-30). Nagel not only try to imagine the state of being like a bat for him, this does not do with the concept. He wanted to know what it is like for the bat itself (Nagel, 1974, 436). Transformation into a bat, even gradually, won’t help him since he wanted to know it on his current situation. This is Nagel point of view that we can make only schematic ascriptions that lack the main character. Although he chose a rather strange example, he reminded readers, that this also happens to people. Perhaps we will never understand, but the deniable of the problem is not right. Nagel explored how it is possible to imagine some things that may never be understood by humans. Then, he returned to the question: What are some organisms which seem to reflect a particular point of view? Nagel said here that he has not declared experience of total privacy (Nagel, 1974, 436). Some objectivity is indeed possible. Alternative views are part of our daily lives, but this is only possible foe the organisms, that bear sufficient similarity. Similarly this is only a degree of measure of the extent of a case in the organism which has never reached 100%. Nagel here sees the issue of a direct physical and psychological impact: What are the facts about being some organisms stick to a point that objective physics seems to be impossible. This is not the argument against reduction. Objective understanding of many things to a certain extent is allowed. But in the case of experience, one thing will always fail: you can not experience from a subjective point of view. Reduction of psychological problems is presented as follows: Where the reduction of other types always leads to greater objectivity, reducing the experience of moving from the subject of attention is doomed to failure (Nagel, 1998, 3-30). In its history, the reductionist’s main task has been to leave out the subjective point of view. But within the world, ignore it is false. This constitutes the failure of (neo) behaviourism. Therefore, the main problem is that, Nagel's sensed that the problem of mind and body’s consciousness will not be solved through the old scientific ways. You can describe at all what is happening in the minds of others...
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