Moral standing of plants vs animals

Should animals be accorded greater moral consideration than plants? Justify your answer.

In this essay, I will explain why I feel that some, but not all, animals should be accorded greater moral consideration than plants from the perspective of hedonism. I will first define the parameters of moral consideration, and then explain why I feel that some animals should be accorded more moral consideration than other animals and all plants.
In order to understand what moral consideration is, we should make the distinction between two kinds of value: intrinsic and instrumental value. To have intrinsic value, something would be valuable in and of itself, and not because it serves a purpose or use to another thing. To have instrumental value, something would be valuable insofar as it serves a purpose or use to another thing, in order to aid in the attainment of something else. To ascribe moral consideration to something is to say that that thing has intrinsic value. A common criterion for ascribing moral consideration to a moral patient is reason or grounds for valuing its well-being, and that we should consider its welfare when making ethical decisions about it. Some things can be given more moral consideration than others. If I feel that X deserves more moral consideration than Y, then I will consider X’s welfare more than Y’s when making an ethical decision. For example, if we agree that a human being deserves to be given moral consideration, we should consider their welfare when making decisions and should try to protect their interests rather than deliberately and knowingly cause them harm. If, on the other hand, we ascribe less moral consideration to a plant than to a human, we do not need to give it as much consideration when making ethical decisions regarding it as we do with a human. Though it is widely accepted that human beings deserve moral consideration, there is much debate on whether this moral consideration should be extended to animals, or even to plants.
Aristotle and Aquinas hold the position that only humans deserve moral consideration because in order to be given moral consideration, one has to possess the ability to think and choose. To them, only humans have this ability, and thus, all non-humans should not have any moral consideration. Duties that we have towards nature and the environment ultimately serve the need of humans. Kant also agrees that non-humans do not have a moral standing. To him, rights and moral standing extend only to autonomous beings capable of rationality. Thus, on his view, only human beings are morally considerable (Desjardins, 2013, pp. 99). However, both these views seem to suggest that infants or mentally handicapped people do not have moral standing, which we see to be intuitively false. If we agree that infants or mentally handicapped people who do not have the capacity to think, choose and reason deserve moral consideration, then the selected criteria is not comprehensive enough. If rationality is placed on a spectrum with humans are on one end and animals on the other, it seems arbitrary to decide on a point where we stop giving moral consideration.
Jeremy Bentham provides a utilitarian view for the criterion of moral standing: the capacity to suffer. To Bentham, “the question is not, can they reason? Nor can they talk? But can they suffer?” (Desjardins, 2013, pp. 100). If the answer is yes, they can suffer, then Bentham would accord them moral consideration. However, it is highly probable that not all animals have the ability to feel pain. This will be discussed later in this essay.
Like there are with animals, there are also supporters of the idea that plants too have moral standing and should be given moral consideration. Schweitzer and Taylor extend moral considerability to not just animals but to all living things because anything with a life has value in and of itself. To them both, anything that has a life should be given moral consideration on the basis that life itself has intrinsic value. As mentioned earlier, moral consideration is ascribed to things with intrinsic value. So, they would feel that not only humans and animals, but plants too should be given moral consideration.
For this essay, I will adopt a hedonistic approach. According to hedonism, what is morally relevant is pleasure and pain. Hedonism claims that the only intrinsic good is pleasure, and the only intrinsic bad is pain, and that the value of the consequences resulting from an act depend solely on the pleasures and pains in the consequences (Sinnott-Armstrong, 2011). Sinhababu makes an epistemic argument for hedonism, and argues that phenomenal introspection reliably informs us of the goodness of pleasure and the badness of pain, unlike that of moral belief. “Those who feel justified in eating meat will easily believe that the animals they eat do not suffer greatly” (Sinhababu, n.d.). If we rely on moral beliefs, we tend to have moral disagreements, and if there are moral disagreements, someone has to be wrong. If there is no consensus, then it seems that relying on moral beliefs is not a reliable means of discerning what is right. If on the other hand, we introspect, we would mostly agree (there is substantially less disagreement) that pleasure is good. Therefore, relying on pleasure and pain as yardsticks is a more epistemically sound move. Pleasure’s goodness, to him, is genuine moral goodness and pain is genuine moral badness. This view differs from Aristotle and Kant’s that what is important is the ability to reason. Sinhababu turns to phenomenal introspection and says that it is generally reliable in forming beliefs because it lets us directly experience, and have firm beliefs, that pleasure is good and pain is bad. We can directly be sure of this because it is something we can experience and detect, and thus believe intuitively that if pleasure is good and pain is bad, we should maximise pleasure and minimise pain. Through his argument, he claims that because of its reliability, phenomenal introspection greatly supports hedonism as a reliable moral theory.
From the view of hedonism, if animals can feel pain, they should be given moral consideration because pain is bad and should be avoided. We should consider their welfare when making ethical decisions instead of deliberately causing them pain. However, I believe it is not that case that all animals can feel pain. According to Singer, pain is a mental state developed by our nervous system, and species closest to us, namely mammals and birds, have similar nervous systems to ours that respond physiologically like ours when faced with pain. This gives us reasonable grounds to believe that they feel pain just as humans do (Singer, 1990, pp. 10). We cannot be sure of the degree of pain they feel but hedonism claims that as long as it is pain, it is bad and thus should be minimised. Richard Sarjeant also claims that there is factual evidence that supports the view that mammalian vertebrates and birds experience pain at least as acutely as humans do (Sarjeant, 1969, pp. 72). While I agree with Singer and Sarjeant, I feel that they fail to account for animals that are very physiologically different from humans. Jane Smith, a professor in the Department of Biomedical Science and Biomedical Ethics at the University of Birmingham, claims that while animals physiologically much different from us, namely the invertebrates, do respond to harmful stimuli, these motor responses can still occur in the absence of consciousness and pain. So, it is reasonable, according to Smith, to say that these responses are simple reflexes that occur without the experience of pain (Smith, 1991).
Though I agree with Singer and Bentham that animals should be accorded moral consideration, just as humans are, because they can feel pain, I restrict this view only to animals that have the capacity to feel pain, and not to all animals. Animals that give us no reasonable grounds to believe that they can feel pain, such as the anchovy or the oyster, should be given no moral consideration according to hedonism. As mentioned earlier, hedonism claims that the only intrinsic good is pleasure, and the only intrinsic bad is pain. Therefore, animals that do not experience pleasure and pain are not intrinsically valuable. They should thus not be accorded moral consideration as moral consideration is accorded to those with intrinsic value. Although they are not intrinsically valuable and are not ascribed moral consideration, they are still instrumentally valuable because they serve a purpose or use to other. If we ascribe them moral consideration, we would care for their welfare and in of themselves. However, because they do not have intrinsic value and thus are not accorded moral consideration, we should only care for their welfare insofar as their welfare benefits other beings in the attainment of pleasure or avoidance of pain. Animals that are physiologically more similar to humans that can feel pleasure or pain would be intrinsically valuable because they are containers of pleasure and pain. For example, a parrot has instrumental value because it can feel pleasure or pain, and thus we should consider its well-being when making ethical decisions as it would be morally bad to intentionally cause it pain. A worm, on the other hand, cannot feel pleasure or pain (at least, we have firm grounds in believing so). However, it can contribute to the well-being of a parrot that consumes it. So, although it is instrumentally valuable to the parrot, we do not consider its welfare on the basis of it being able to suffer or not, and do not consider its well-being like we do to that of the parrot. The parrot deserves more moral consideration than the worm, which deserves none. However, we could still care for its welfare so far as it involves the well-being of the parrot. If we completely disregard the welfare of worms such that all the worms in the world die, their absence may cause pain to the parrots when faced with hunger, having one source of food depleted.
So far, I have established that on the view of hedonism, what has intrinsic value is what can feel pleasure or pain, and thus should be ascribed moral consideration. Animals that have intrinsic value should be given more moral consideration than animals that cannot feel pain, as the latter only has instrumental value. Mentioned earlier in this essay, Schweitzer and Taylor claim that plants too should be given moral consideration because they have intrinsic value. However, because plants lack any type of nervous system, they are intuitively seen as beings that cannot feel pleasure or pain. According to hedonism, plants would not have intrinsic value because they, unlike mammals or birds, are not containers of pleasure or pain. They only have instrumental value. For example, trees have value because they are homes for birds, and they provide humans with oxygen. Schweitzer and Taylor are then wrong to say that they should be given moral consideration on the basis that they have intrinsic value. Their view that life itself is important and valuable is not sufficient to say that something is intrinsically valuable because it has a life. The criteria for intrinsic value should be narrowed down further to the ability to feel pleasure or pain. Although trees are not intrinsically valuable, they do, however, deserve consideration (although it is not a moral consideration) because their welfare aids in the welfare or attainment of pleasure of others. Considering the tree’s welfare and protecting it would be to allow birds and humans to benefit or draw pleasure from it.
In this essay, I have defined the parameters of moral consideration. I explained why certain animals have a moral status, just as humans do, because they too can experience pain. I adopted a hedonistic approach and explained why hedonism works for this account, and with hedonism, explained why animals that can feel pleasure and pain have intrinsic value and why animals that cannot feel pain, and all plants, have only instrumental value. I further claimed that an animal should be accorded more moral consideration if it has intrinsic value, and no moral consideration if it only has instrumental value.
To conclude, while I agree that animals should be given more moral consideration than plants, I do not agree that this applies to all animals. Instead, I feel that animals that can feel pleasure or pain should be accorded more moral consideration than plants.

References:
Desjardins, Joseph. (2013). Environmental Ethics - An Invitation to Environmental Philosophy, 5th ed. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth
Sarjeant, Richard. (1969). The Spectrum of Pain. London: Hart-Davis
Singer, Peter. (1990). Animal Liberation, 2nd edition. New York: Avon Books
Sinhababu, Neil. (n.d.) The Epistemic Argument For Hedonism. Unpublished.
Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. (2012). "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.)
Smith, Jane. A. (1991). A Question of Pain in Invertebrates. Institute for Laboratory Animals Journal: Oxford University Press

References: Desjardins, Joseph. (2013). Environmental Ethics - An Invitation to Environmental Philosophy, 5th ed. Belmont, Calif: Wadsworth Sarjeant, Richard. (1969). The Spectrum of Pain. London: Hart-Davis Singer, Peter. (1990). Animal Liberation, 2nd edition. New York: Avon Books Sinhababu, Neil. (n.d.) The Epistemic Argument For Hedonism. Unpublished. Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. (2012). "Consequentialism", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2012 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.) Smith, Jane. A. (1991). A Question of Pain in Invertebrates. Institute for Laboratory Animals Journal: Oxford University Press