Moral Relativism
Moral Relativism: An Evaluation
The world is becoming an increasingly smaller place, culturally speaking. The modern world has more bridges to other cultures and ways of thinking than ever before. This phenomenon is due largely to the advent of the internet, global industry, and increased travel for business and pleasure to opposite corners of the world. This “global village” we live in introduces the average person to more cultural, and seemingly moral, differences than previous generations experienced. Ruth Benedict’s “Case for Moral Relativism” claims beliefs and practices form irrationally and randomly, creating a world where no one morality is ‘better’ than any other morality. In this paper, I will discuss moral relativism and cultural relativism, and how they relate to each other. Further, in discussion of Pojman’s objectivism, ‘holes’ in the relativist moral theory will rear their ugly heads. I believe there is a middle ground between the two theories, Objectivism and Relativism, and that tolerance is not always a bad thing.
Moral relativism is often equated with cultural relativism. However, anthropologists cringe at this notion, as defended by Thomas Johnson in his essay, “Cultural Relativism: Interpretations of a Concept.” Johnson argues that true cultural relativism should not “…prevent an educated person from taking a stand on a variety of moral issues…” (Johnson 794). Rather, cultural relativism is a tool for the objective study of a different culture and leads “…to a much stronger notion of moral values, values that can and should be acted upon…” (Johnson 795). This view differs from Bendedict’s moral relativism in that while cultural relativism is a tool from which moral attitudes and actions may stem, moral relativism maintains all cultures are equal, and therefore all cultures and cultural practices must be tolerated. Benedict is not alone in her biased presumptions. In his article, “In Defense of Relativism,” Frank Oppenheim asserts,
The world is becoming an increasingly smaller place, culturally speaking. The modern world has more bridges to other cultures and ways of thinking than ever before. This phenomenon is due largely to the advent of the internet, global industry, and increased travel for business and pleasure to opposite corners of the world. This “global village” we live in introduces the average person to more cultural, and seemingly moral, differences than previous generations experienced. Ruth Benedict’s “Case for Moral Relativism” claims beliefs and practices form irrationally and randomly, creating a world where no one morality is ‘better’ than any other morality. In this paper, I will discuss moral relativism and cultural relativism, and how they relate to each other. Further, in discussion of Pojman’s objectivism, ‘holes’ in the relativist moral theory will rear their ugly heads. I believe there is a middle ground between the two theories, Objectivism and Relativism, and that tolerance is not always a bad thing.
Moral relativism is often equated with cultural relativism. However, anthropologists cringe at this notion, as defended by Thomas Johnson in his essay, “Cultural Relativism: Interpretations of a Concept.” Johnson argues that true cultural relativism should not “…prevent an educated person from taking a stand on a variety of moral issues…” (Johnson 794). Rather, cultural relativism is a tool for the objective study of a different culture and leads “…to a much stronger notion of moral values, values that can and should be acted upon…” (Johnson 795). This view differs from Bendedict’s moral relativism in that while cultural relativism is a tool from which moral attitudes and actions may stem, moral relativism maintains all cultures are equal, and therefore all cultures and cultural practices must be tolerated. Benedict is not alone in her biased presumptions. In his article, “In Defense of Relativism,” Frank Oppenheim asserts,
Cited: University Press, 2004. 157-165. Fellowship of St James. “Interfaith News.” Touchstone: A Journal of Mere Christianity. 20.4 (May 2007): 43 University Press, 2004. 166-190.