The Effectiveness of Military Strategies of the Irish Republican Army during the War of Independence

Assess the effectiveness of the military strategies of the Irish Republican Army during the War of Independence, 1919-21.

At the outbreak of hostilities it was apparent that the I.R.A. could not hope to win a traditional stand up military fight against a modern, well equipped army with the financial backing of The British Empire. In order to engage the crown forces in a guerrilla war, weapons and ammunition were required in large numbers. General Head Quarters (G.H.Q.) authorized smuggling operations and had sent volunteers abroad to procure arms. G.H.Q. sold arms to the individual units, many of which were hampered in their operational status due to lack of funding to purchase weapons and ammunition.

As the war progressed many Royal Irish Constabulary (R.I.C.) barracks and the Crowns Tax Offices were attacked and burned. GHQ issued a general raid order in September of 1920. The primary objective the Volunteers attacks on isolated R.I.C. barracks were to obtain arms and ammunition. Many of these barracks were poorly defended and usually consisted of terraced houses. In order to disrupt the governance of rural areas, tax offices were targeted. These targets allowed collection of funds from the local populace that were to be appropriated to the Crown.

These tactics were adopted by many units when news of the initial successes of these barracks and tax office attacks filtered out, throughout the country. The volunteers embarked on a campaign of Intimidation of R.I.C men and their families, and members of the general public who supported the crown forces, many of which were shot. This tactic was extremely effective at reducing the morale of the R.I.C. Recruitment dropped and resignations increased in the organization The R.I.C. retreated to larger towns after it was decided to evacuate may rural barracks. This tactic led to large parts of rural Ireland becoming ungovernable. This allowed the Dail to implement their much heralded Courts System,

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