Military Intervention in Politics
LOST IN TRANSITION: THE WORLD ACCORDING TO EGYPT’S SCAF
Middle East Report N°121 – 24 April 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since it assumed power after Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, the performance of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been, at times, head-scratching. Extolled in the wake of the uprising as the revolution’s protector, many have come to view it as an agent of the counter-revolution. It often has been obstinate, before abruptly yielding to pressure. It values its long ties with Washington, from which it receives much assistance, but seemed willing to jeopardise them by targeting U.S.-funded NGOs. Sus-pected by Islamists of seeking to deprive them of oppor-tunity to govern and by non-Islamists of entering a secret pact with the Muslim Brotherhood, it finds itself in the worst of both worlds: an angry tug-of-war with liberal protesters and a high-wire contest with Islamists. It dis-plays little interest in governing, wishing instead to pro-tect privileges, but erratic behaviour threatens even that. On the eve of presidential elections that have become a high-stakes free-for-all, the SCAF should take a step back and, with the full range of political actors, agree on prin-ciples for a genuine and safe political transition.
What has the SCAF been thinking? Understanding the Egyptian military’s mindset is difficult and requires mod-esty in reaching conclusions. At the core of the SCAF’s outlook is the conviction that its principal complaints against the Mubarak regime – the slide toward hereditary government; the excesses of neoliberal policies; ostenta-tious corruption by networks associated with the president’s family – faithfully reflected the public’s. Once it had ousted the president, it follows, it felt it had accomplished the rev-olution’s goals. As a corollary, the SCAF was and is in-clined to view any who continued to protest after Muba-rak’s fall as serving either their own narrow self-interests or, worse, those of foreign powers (read: the
Middle East Report N°121 – 24 April 2012
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Since it assumed power after Hosni Mubarak’s ouster, the performance of the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) has been, at times, head-scratching. Extolled in the wake of the uprising as the revolution’s protector, many have come to view it as an agent of the counter-revolution. It often has been obstinate, before abruptly yielding to pressure. It values its long ties with Washington, from which it receives much assistance, but seemed willing to jeopardise them by targeting U.S.-funded NGOs. Sus-pected by Islamists of seeking to deprive them of oppor-tunity to govern and by non-Islamists of entering a secret pact with the Muslim Brotherhood, it finds itself in the worst of both worlds: an angry tug-of-war with liberal protesters and a high-wire contest with Islamists. It dis-plays little interest in governing, wishing instead to pro-tect privileges, but erratic behaviour threatens even that. On the eve of presidential elections that have become a high-stakes free-for-all, the SCAF should take a step back and, with the full range of political actors, agree on prin-ciples for a genuine and safe political transition.
What has the SCAF been thinking? Understanding the Egyptian military’s mindset is difficult and requires mod-esty in reaching conclusions. At the core of the SCAF’s outlook is the conviction that its principal complaints against the Mubarak regime – the slide toward hereditary government; the excesses of neoliberal policies; ostenta-tious corruption by networks associated with the president’s family – faithfully reflected the public’s. Once it had ousted the president, it follows, it felt it had accomplished the rev-olution’s goals. As a corollary, the SCAF was and is in-clined to view any who continued to protest after Muba-rak’s fall as serving either their own narrow self-interests or, worse, those of foreign powers (read: the