Midterm Review Outline

Schelling 1966 - Arms and Influence [1-34, 69-189]

Preface - Original the power to hurt as a tool of bargaining force as part of diplomacy when it is used to extract some behavior from a target, difference from pure force
Diplomacy of Violence how countries use their capacity for violence as bargaining power

Ch 1 - The Diplomacy of Violence: Pages 1-34
Diplomacy vs. force
Diplomacy is bargaining - Diplomacy seeks outcomes that are better for both parties than some of the alternatives – each somewhat controls what the other wants and can get more by compromise than fighting. With enough military force a country might not need to bargain – “enough” depends on what the opponent has.
Force can also be used to HURT - Today we can no longer take, but hurt (no one expected the USSR to conquer America, or America to take a piece of the USSR) destroy things of precious value to others cause suffering and pain key is victims desire to avoid further suffering to coerce another’s decision to change their behavior
To be coercive
(Conditions) - violence must be anticipated and avoidable by accommodation.
The power to hurt is more successful when held in reserve
You need to know what your adversary treasures
Adversary needs to know what will provoke and what will remove the threat (contingent on behavior) *
Brute Force vs. Coercion - Brute force can only do what requires no collaboration. If there is no question as to who would win a military battle – fight, otherwise – bargain.
Nukes (what have they changed, what has not changed)
Difference with nuclear weapons: quicker, computerized
It is possible, but not inevitable, that nuclear weapons will be used in warfare
Victory is no longer a prerequisite to hurt
Sequence of war is reversed – destroy nation as prelude to destroying enemy forces
Cannot spare defeated country after nuclear weapons are used.
Killing many could always be done, now there is an expectation that it would be done in warfare – “parallel exercise in devastation”
Might also not happen – you can hit the enemy’s weapons and leave them powerless to retaliate
You might also just use the nuclear weapons to hurt – McNamara in 1972. His approach: take out military targets while keeping nuclear weapons as a threat to civilians

Non Combatants (roles in 3 historical stages) – See Lectures

Ch 2 - The Art of Commitment: Page 69
Difficulties in making threats credible
It is irrelevant if the consequences of the threat might hurt you too
Being or being believed to be rational and in control is not always helpful (the threat might not be understood so not effective) – “national impulsivity” might be more frightening
You have to arrange it so that we have no choice but to act upon our threat if rules are infringed on
Deterrence often relies on relinquishing initiative to the other side
Another way of making a threat: incur a political involvement, get nation’s diplomatic reputation committed to a response
Threats are interdependent – we have to act because if we did not, you would not believe us when we say that we will act in another situation – losing reputation is not desired
Escaping commitments Equally difficult to get out of a commitment as to make one credible
You might need the adversary’s cooperation to do this and not lose face
“Salami Tactics” – like a child you tell cannot swim but he puts in his feet in the water, then slowly moves out, not technically breaking the rules but pushing your resolve to test your seriousness
Sometimes blockades/cutting off supplies are more effective than a full-on invasion/intrusion
Deterrence vs. Compellence Difference: who makes the first move? Whose initiative is tested?
Compellence: threat that remains until he acts rather than if he acts, has a definite timing, ambiguous as to what the adversary is asked to do – communication is key. Action must be tolerable to adversary until he acts.
Deterrence: threat that happens if the adversary acts. Discourage through fear. Setting the stage and waiting. Often non-intrusive and non-hostile. This can eventually become too costly
Both of these strategies require assurance: both that you will carry out your threat if I misbehave, and that you will stop your threat if I act as you wish *
Defense and Deterrence, Offense and Compellence graduated deterrence forcible defense: resist successfully so that the enemy cannot succeed defensive action
“Coercive”/”deterrent” defense: object – induce him not to proceed due to costs. Can also defend knowing you will lose, because this proves to future opponents that fighting you will be costly.
Forcible Offense v. Compellence. Pure offense (contrast to compellence): taking/occupying something by a direct action that the enemy cannot block
Compellence makes the adversary who gives in look weak – submission
Unlike deterrence, the enemy cannot claim they were going to act this way regardless of your threat: humiliating element
Compel: individuals vs. governments (what are the differences)
Connectedness
Deterrence usually has connectedness between the proscribed action and response – compellence doesn’t.
Keep threat and command in the same currency anyways, create connectedness.
Why connect threat and command?
Helps communicate threat
Limit demands (don’t be unreasonable, distinguish them so that smaller demands are easier for the adversary to meet)
Compellence and Brinkmanship
Ideal compellent action:
Causes minimal harm if compliance is forthcoming
Consistent with time schedule
Cannot be recalled once initiated
Cannot be stopped by initiating party but automatically stops when compliance comes
All of this fully understood by adversary
Only adversary can avert consequences.

Ch 3 - The Manipulation of Risk: Page 92
War as resulting from a process
Not a clean clear cut yes no decision – no one is foolish enough to decide to undertake nuclear war. Nothing one side would be willing to defend with nuclear force that the other would want so much as to use nuclear force. Main point is that war is the result of a process of misunderstandings of consequences, which leaves other side with no choice other than nuclear war. Unforeseeable string of events. CMC is good example of this: seen as closest world came to nuclear war, but it is unimaginable that USSR and US would have chosen steps that lead to nuclear war, the risk lay in the possibility of events getting out of hand, not understanding how other side will react.
Brinkmanship = manipulating the shared risk of war. Since war results from unforeseeable course of events and non-careful risk-taking, brinksmanship is an important concept. Basically, since there is so much uncertainty: should set up some kind of trip-wire diplomacy that triggers nuclear war (see example of chess). Important to note the risk is shared and thus requires an understanding of adversary (psychology, tactics, etc.)
Limited War as a Generator of Risk
Main purpose is not the immediate tactical, but the threat of larger war: war in Europe is not an end in itself, and NATO troops in Europe could not always effectively repel USSR, however they can, through resistance, show the extent of the West’s resolve and up the stakes and risks, especially once nuclear weapons are introduced.
Unpredictability is the key. Once again, unpredictability and risk are the main factors that should influence strategic decisions. Unpredictability is the key to effective deterrence as we have seen that no one actually wants nuclear war. If we can make others believe that their actions can trigger more and more riskier actions, then maybe things will get out of hand and nuclear war might be forced upon us.

Ch 4 - The Idiom of Military Action: pg 126
Tacit Bargains and Conventional Limits – Importance of unspoken agreements on the battlefield: example of Geneva accords during WWII which were upheld even by non-signatories and at a time when there was no diplomacy, however upheld because of expectation of reciprocity.
No is more simple and unambiguous than some specific limit on volume or use.
Examples of nukes and gas. Similarly, no one actually said no gas during WWII or no nukes during Korean War, but each side understood potential damage and pain that could be inflicted, and refrained from using them tacit bargain. See thresholds part.
Symbolic difference – thresholds are usually chosen because of their symbolic meaning and not because of a strategic reason (example of Yalu river in Korea to the North of which US didn’t bomb) because it is an easier tacit agreement between the two parties.
Phenomenon of “thresholds” – No nukes were used because all-or-nothing distinctions are more easily upheld than differences in degrees (who can be subjected to gas, how much, etc.) and less willingness to cross the threshold (easier to go from 10th to 11th nuke than to send the first one), also once the first nuke has been sent there is some expectation from the other side that another can or will be sent and no more threshold. Example of Chinese troops during Korean War: full scale attack, however not very different than sending two divisions for Chinese and US – threshold crossed.
The Idiom of Reprisal make the punishment fit the crime, maintain the same currency, impose a coherent pattern on relations. Best exemplified by the Gulf of Tonkin attacks. Vietnamese troops attacked a US destroyer twice in two days and the US retaliated by bombing the port from which the ships departed. Retaliation is calibrated and well-targeted, makes it easier for both parties to understand what is being done and why, avoids war getting out of hands and irrational behavior.
Tactical Responses and Diplomatic Responses – Two kinds of responses associated with the enlargement of a conflict: tactical is one that is needed (like Chinese involvement in Korea) and diplomatic is one that sends a message (like Gulf of Tonkin). Enlargement of the conflict can be seen as crossing a limit or a threshold. Limits vary (geographical borders or historical limits (Pusan in Vietnam) or introducing new weapons or attacking US ships in Tonkin) and crossing a limit can be met with escalation of conflict and breaching of a new limit or a “matching response” such as the one used by US in Tonkin: adversaries must be careful as to how they behave during war. During Cold War, “ultimate limit” was the use of nuclear weapons or attack on either US or USSR soil (which McNamara tried to alter with the no-cities doctrine).
Wars of the Battlefield, Risk, of Pain and Destruction
Species of limited warfare
Korea=military engagement – for a long-time only idea of limited war in US
Cuban=diplomatic, competition in risk taking rather than actual combat since no shot was fired
Vietnam=brinkmanship during actual war also direct exercise of power to hurt: who can show the most power and resolve to hurt the other, in comparison to the intrinsic worth of the war.
Limits - tend to be qualitative types, not matters of degree: arbitrary decision in types of weapons, targets , etc. possess a legalistic quality - not allowable at all, no matter degree : a behavior is either inside or outside of the limit and one limit is broken, no assurance that any other will be upheld.
Reprisal and Hot Pursuit – two special cases that fall in between qualitative limitations and quantitative application of coercive violence. Reprisal is a punishment for a specific act (like Gulf of Tonkin incident) and has a direct linkage with a recognizable act (even though it may spiral out of control into endless acts of reprisals). Reprisal differs from coercive warfare in that it is not intended to resolve the initial dispute. * Hot pursuit is the act of pursuing an attacker back into his own territory: however term is coined because this differs from breaching limits in an attack. This becomes quite routine in warfare.

* Additional Terms and Concepts *
Non strategic force swagger revenge
To use coercion - 4 necessary conditions
Extra Conditions - 2 which facilitate coercion power technology
Stable deterrent balance (as opposed to unstable)
Counter Force
Counter Value
Active Defense
Passive Defense
Visibility and Ease of Compliance with Deterrence vs. Compellence