The particularist would argue that there is NO possible way of having knowledge of a METHOD, itself, without first defining a pure knowledge, since the idea of method would be a derivative of a first, pure, knowledge. In other words, the idea of "method" isn't possible without an idea of knowledge. An example would be a table. I know this table is real, so, therefore, I have a method of knowing that this desk next to it, is real.
A Methodist would say that you cannot establish any kind of knowledge without first establishing a sound method of "knowing" that knowledge to be true. In other words, any idea of knowledge is not possible without first acquiring a pure "method" of truth gathering. An example would be a table again. I knock on the table. This is a method to decide whether this is a table or not. This verifies that the table is real. Therefore, I have a method to decide whether or not the table is real and then I have the knowledge that the table is real.
Both of these responses to the skeptical argument of the circular problem of criterion are flawed. The skeptical dilemma arises from the two positions, in the first place.
The skeptic realizes that both are still circular. Neither has made a reasonable and sound argument. Therefore, it assumes that neither are correct and that you just cannot know. In each of the examples there is a presupposition. In the particularist view, the supposition is that the table is real, it just is. In the Methodist view, senses lead to the belief that the table is real. But are either of these really true? This is where the skeptic comes into play. The skeptic view is that both of these examples have a presupposition which means that you have to believe in something without really knowing if it is true. A skeptic argues that both views, particularist and...