Locke Innate Knowledge

Innate ideas
John Locke, a renowned English philosopher in the seventeenth century, argued against the

pre-existing prevalent belief of innate knowledge, such as those led by Descartes. Many of

Locke’s arguments begin with criticisms on philosophers’ opinion on innate knowledge,

notably Descartes. Therefore, many of Locke’s arguments are direct rebuttals of Descartes

and other philosophers’ beliefs about the existence of innate knowledge. To arrive at the

conclusion that innate knowledge is impossible, Locke comes with various premises and

rebuttals that add weight to his arguments.

First, Locke emphasizes that knowledge and ideas are learned through experience, not

innately. He argues that people’s
For example, the color blue and the

‘blueness’ of something is not that which is learned innately but is some is learned through

exposures to a blue object or thing. So if we do have a universal understanding of ‘blueness’,

it is because we are exposed to blue objects ever since we were young. The blue sky is what

many would acquaint with blue easily and at a young age.

Second, Locke argues that people have no innate principles. Locke contended that innate

principles rely upon innate ideas within people but such innate ideas do not exist. He says

this on the basis that there is no ‘universal consent’ that everyone agrees upon. Locke quotes

that ‘There is nothing more commonly taken for granted that there are certain principles

universally agreed upon by all mankind, but there are none to which all mankind give a

universal assent’. This argues against the very foundation of the idea of innate knowledge

because principles that garner universal assent are thought to be known innately, simply because it is the best explanation available. However, it cannot even be an explanation
There are many intelligent people out there who take their status for granted and do not

think, contemplate or make an effort to their best extent.

The objections that are made against the initial arguments can be defended in certain ways.

Regarding the objection that since there are innate ideas in the mind at an early age, innate knowledge exists, the term ‘innate’ should be thought of again in greater detail. Innate

knowledge has to be significant enough for us to recount to be considered such. Thus, there

comes a risk with considering the ideas within our minds early on as innate. For example, the

knowledge of our hands and feet maybe imbedded to us at a very early stage. The knowledge

of using our hands and feet are not so significant. The knowledge that we gain through our

use of hands and feet could be vital knowledge that we may recount throughout. Throwing a

baseball properly under a coach’s instructions is an example.

Also, there is the claim that intelligence cannot be the sole indicator of one’s acquisition of

‘universal consent’ and that there isn’t a clear distinction of those who can