Leadership Performance of Linda Ham: Analysis
LEADERSHIP IN PRACTICE
MPA 5002
Introduction: For this paper, I have chosen to analyze the leadership performance of Linda Ham, Chair of Mission Management Team, and Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 1992–2001. Both, in my estimation, were part of the problem, and not part of the solution. Both succumbed to outside political forces and placed much more emphasis on meeting self-imposed deadlines than astronaut safety. Both gradually dismissed the vast majority of the recommendations of the Rogers Commission after the loss of the Challenger and doomed NASA to repeat history.
Background of leader #1:
Linda Ham, Chair of the Mission Management team for the last Columbia mission, was hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after she graduated college. She began her career with NASA as a Propulsion Systems Monitor at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. Over the years she rose through the ranks of NASA to Chair the Mission Management team for STS-107, which was the failed mission of the Space Shuttle Columbia that broke up upon re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere.
Background of leader #2:
Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 1992–2001, was hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after he graduated college. He began his career at NASA’s Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio working in electric propulsion systems for human interplanetary travel. He left NASA a few years later and began working for the TRW Space and Technology Group. Over his 25 year career at TRW, Goldin rose through the ranks to become the Vice President and General Manager of TRW. Goldin then returned to NASA and became its longest tenured Administrator. Goldin was known for being able to cut costs and still provide many space programs. His “crusade for efficiency” (2004) ended up being the most visible flaw in an administration philosophy that lost another seven
MPA 5002
Introduction: For this paper, I have chosen to analyze the leadership performance of Linda Ham, Chair of Mission Management Team, and Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 1992–2001. Both, in my estimation, were part of the problem, and not part of the solution. Both succumbed to outside political forces and placed much more emphasis on meeting self-imposed deadlines than astronaut safety. Both gradually dismissed the vast majority of the recommendations of the Rogers Commission after the loss of the Challenger and doomed NASA to repeat history.
Background of leader #1:
Linda Ham, Chair of the Mission Management team for the last Columbia mission, was hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after she graduated college. She began her career with NASA as a Propulsion Systems Monitor at the Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center in Houston, Texas. Over the years she rose through the ranks of NASA to Chair the Mission Management team for STS-107, which was the failed mission of the Space Shuttle Columbia that broke up upon re-entry into the earth’s atmosphere.
Background of leader #2:
Daniel S. Goldin, NASA Administrator, 1992–2001, was hired by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) soon after he graduated college. He began his career at NASA’s Lewis Research Center in Cleveland, Ohio working in electric propulsion systems for human interplanetary travel. He left NASA a few years later and began working for the TRW Space and Technology Group. Over his 25 year career at TRW, Goldin rose through the ranks to become the Vice President and General Manager of TRW. Goldin then returned to NASA and became its longest tenured Administrator. Goldin was known for being able to cut costs and still provide many space programs. His “crusade for efficiency” (2004) ended up being the most visible flaw in an administration philosophy that lost another seven