Investigating the ‘Belief Bias’ Effect in Human Reasoning
Investigating the ‘Belief Bias’ Effect in Human Reasoning
Abstract
In this report an experiment was conducted to investigate the belief bias effect in human reason, the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Belief biases were observed despite controls for conversion of premises. Belief bias was shown to be more marked in the invalid than the valid syllogisms. This consistent interaction between belief and logic was also noted. However, participants were intermediate in there response to syllogisms that were valid but had unbelievable conclusions. For 8 syllogisms presented, responses were collected as to whether the conclusion followed logically form the premises or not and a 2-factor ANOVA was performed in order to find the main effects and interaction present between the variables (believability & logicality)
A conflict between logic and belief was identified and explored in terms of Evan Dual Process theory, which supposes 2 cognitive systems for human inference, the unconscious, autonomous system 1, and the uniquely human system 2, which requires slow conscious effort, enabling abstract thought and reasoning based on memory and prior beliefs.
Introduction
Cognitive psychologists have long debated the notion of rationality in human inference. This debate has been split by irrational processes in the study of inductive and deductive inference (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and the more dominant position of the rationalist interpretation of inferential behaviour (Revlin & Mayer, 1978). In the broader history of psychology, earlier than the mid 1960’s, there was a general assumption that we were quite logical in our decision making processes, such as in the case of deductive reasoning, whether of the ‘philosophers’ variety (Henle, 1962) or of an alternative ‘natural’ type (Braine, 1978), indicating that intelligence could be a predictor of logicality. However this view was to be challenged with much research in arising from the late
Abstract
In this report an experiment was conducted to investigate the belief bias effect in human reason, the weighting attached to logic and belief in syllogistic reasoning. Belief biases were observed despite controls for conversion of premises. Belief bias was shown to be more marked in the invalid than the valid syllogisms. This consistent interaction between belief and logic was also noted. However, participants were intermediate in there response to syllogisms that were valid but had unbelievable conclusions. For 8 syllogisms presented, responses were collected as to whether the conclusion followed logically form the premises or not and a 2-factor ANOVA was performed in order to find the main effects and interaction present between the variables (believability & logicality)
A conflict between logic and belief was identified and explored in terms of Evan Dual Process theory, which supposes 2 cognitive systems for human inference, the unconscious, autonomous system 1, and the uniquely human system 2, which requires slow conscious effort, enabling abstract thought and reasoning based on memory and prior beliefs.
Introduction
Cognitive psychologists have long debated the notion of rationality in human inference. This debate has been split by irrational processes in the study of inductive and deductive inference (Nisbett & Ross, 1980) and the more dominant position of the rationalist interpretation of inferential behaviour (Revlin & Mayer, 1978). In the broader history of psychology, earlier than the mid 1960’s, there was a general assumption that we were quite logical in our decision making processes, such as in the case of deductive reasoning, whether of the ‘philosophers’ variety (Henle, 1962) or of an alternative ‘natural’ type (Braine, 1978), indicating that intelligence could be a predictor of logicality. However this view was to be challenged with much research in arising from the late
References: Braine, M. D. S. On the relation between natural logic of reasoning and standard logic. Psychological Review, 1978, (85) 1-21 Capon, A Evans, J. St. B. T. & Barston, J. L. & Pollard, P. On the Conflict between Logic and Belief in Syllogistic Reasoning. Memory & Cognition. 1983, 11 (3), 295-306 Henle, M Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. Human Inference; strategies and short-comings of social judgement. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice Hall, 1980 Revlin, R Stanovich, K. E & West, R.F. Individual differences in reasoning: Implications for the rationality debate. Behavioural Brain Science, 2000, (23), 645-726 Appendices