Kulliyyah of Economic and Sciences International Islamic University Malaysia
Issues in Islamic economics
DR. MUHAMMAD YUSUF SALEEM
Financial Crisis Recovery
Bahiyah Mohsin Fadzli (0810620)
Fahmaninda Listiyani (0828520)
Meriati Ramli (0738342)
Muthia Rosadila (0825134)
1997-1998 Financial Crisis
The weaknesses in Asian financial systems were at the root of the crisis that caused largely by the lack of incentives for effective risk management created by implicit or explicit government guarantees against failure. The weaknesses of the financial sector also were masked by rapid growth and accentuated by large capital inflows, which were partly encouraged by pegged exchange rates. In the mid-1990s, a series of external shocks began to change the economic environment - the devaluation of the Chinese Renminbi and the Japanese Yen, rising of U.S. interest rates which led to a strong U.S. dollar, the sharp decline in semiconductor prices; adversely affected their growth. The crisis began in Thailand when the Thai baht collapse of in July 1997 with a series of speculative attacks on the baht extended after quite a few decades of outstanding economic performance in Asia. As the U.S. economy recovered from a recession in the early 1990s, the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank under Alan Greenspan began to raise U.S. interest rates to head off inflation. This made the U.S. a more attractive investment destination relative to Southeast Asia, which had been attracting hot money flows through high short-term interest rates, and raised the value of the U.S. dollar. For the Southeast Asian nations which had currencies pegged to the U.S. dollar, the higher U.S. dollar caused their own exports to become more expensive and less competitive in the global markets. At the same time, Southeast Asia's export growth slowed dramatically in the spring of 1996, deteriorating their current account position. Many economists believe that the Asian crisis was created not by market psychology or technology, but by policies that distorted incentives within the lender–borrower relationship. Impacts of the crisis to the South East Asia
Most of Southeast Asia and Japan having currency depreciation, devalued stock markets and other asset prices, and a precipitous rise in private debt. It were resulting large quantities of credit became available generated a highly leveraged economic climate, and pushed up asset prices to an unsustainable level. These asset prices eventually began to collapse, causing individuals, financial institutions and corporations in the affected countries were bankrupt. A change in market sentiment could and did lead into a violent of currency depreciation, insolvency, and capital outflows, which was difficult to stop. In the year after collapse of the baht peg, the value of the most affected East Asian currencies fell 35-83% against the U.S. dollar (measured in dollars per unit of the Asian currency), and the most serious stock declines were as great as 40-60%. Lenders led to a large withdrawal of credit from the crisis countries, causing a credit crunch and further bankruptcies. Foreign investors attempted to withdraw their money; the exchange market was flooded with the currencies of the crisis countries, putting depreciative pressure on their exchange rates. As a result, short-term economic activity has slowed or contracted severely in the most affected economies like inflation and rising in unemployment.
It impossible that the government doing nothing when the crisis happened to their country. To prevent currency values collapsing, countries governments raised fiscal spending in domestic interest rates to exceedingly high levels (to help diminish flight of capital by making lending more attractive to investors) and to intervene in the exchange market, buying up any excess domestic currency at the fixed exchange rate with foreign reserves. But when interest rates were very...
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