Essay on Piety

In Euthyphro, Plato juxtaposes the predicaments of Socrates and Euthyphro to delve deep into the issues of ethics and justice. On the one hand, Socrates has been indicted for corrupting the youth and ungodliness. On the other hand, Euthyphro has willingly decided to prosecute his father—the equivalent of committing blasphemy—for the crime of murdering a servant. Perplexed by Euthyphro’s decision, Socrates remarks that Euthyphro must have expert wisdom of divine law to take such actions against his own father. Subsequently, Socrates insists that Euthyphro teach him a lesson in piety; he believes that learning Euthyphro’s unquestionable knowledge of piety could help him get acquitted in his trial against Meletus. Through their interaction, Euthyphro presents Socrates with four distinct definitions of piety. Nevertheless, Socrates identifies flaws in each potential definition Euthyphro offers him. Based on Euthyphro’s boast, Socrates asks Euthyphro to provide him with an essentialist definition of piety. Nevertheless, the first definition Euthyphro proposes to Socrates is ostensive—it uses examples to differentiate between acts that are pious and impious. Euthyphro explains that “the pious [action] is to do what [he is] doing now, to prosecute the wrongdoer…not to prosecute [would be] impious” (5d-e). In this context, Euthyphro insists that prosecuting his father would be justified. Although Athenian culture condemns patricide, Euthyphro argues that justice should not be sacrificed for the sanctity of family bonds. He references the story of Zeus to further validate his argument. Even though Athenian men consider Zeus to be the “best” and “most righteous” of the gods, they admit that he committed patricide by imprisoning his father (Kronos)” (6a). Subsequently, Euthyphro believes it would be hypocritical for Athens to criticize him for upholding the Gods’ standards. Even so, Socrates is not satisfied with Euthyphro’s argument. Socrates asserts that “[he] did not bid [Euthyphro] tell one or two of the many pious actions but that form itself that makes all pious actions pious” (6d-e). Rather, Euthyphro should explain why certain actions are considered pious and others are determined to be impious. Euthyphro agrees with Socrates’ objection and conjures up his second definition of piety.
In Euthyphro’s second attempt at defining piety, he solves the problem of essentialism by providing a rationale behind piety. He declares that “what is dear to the gods is pious, [and] what is not is impious” (7a). Despite the fact that Euthyphro’s definition meets Socrates’ only condition, Socrates cautiously examines it. By challenging Euthyphro’s logic, Socrates unveils a new problem with the definition—it violates the principle of bivalence. Previously in their discussion, Euthyphro acknowledged that the gods are in a constant state of conflict. Socrates asserts that although differences involving trivial issues may be simply resolved, deciding “the just and unjust... [And] the good and the bad” will cause major disputes between humans and among the gods (7d). This brings the discussion back to the first question. If it is possible for one god to believe an action is pious while another believes that it is impious, then how does one decide what is just? In a final effort to validate prosecuting his father, Euthyphro contends that “no god would differ from one another, that whoever has killed anyone unjustly should pay the penalty” (8c). However, Socrates responds by asserting that the gods base their interpretations of justice on the same experiences—signifying that an external factor outside of the gods control must determine the piety of an action.
In his third attempt to define piety, Euthyphro adds the qualifier all to his previous argument. He explains that “the pious is what all the gods love, and the opposite, what all the gods hate, is the impious” (9e). On the one hand, this definition resolves the problem that was created in the second attempt. Since all the gods are agreeing on what is pious and impious, the definition adheres to the principle of bivalence. However, after careful thinking, Socrates raises the question: “Is the pious loved by the gods because it is pious, or is it pious because it is loved by the gods” (10a)? In other words, do the gods love something because it is pious, or is something pious because the gods love it? Socrates and Euthyphro both accept the first claim, which allows them to recognize the paradox embedded in the entire statement. If the gods believe that something is pious because it is pious, then there must be objective laws independent from the gods that govern piety. Consequently, piety would exist without the gods’ commands. Conversely, if something is pious because it is loved by the gods, then piety is arbitrary. Whatever the gods love at a particular time would distinguish the pious from impious. Therefore, Socrates realizes that Euthyphro’s definition describes an “affect or quality…but [Euthyphro has] not yet told [him] what pious is” (11b). Although Euthyphro becomes irritated, he summons the strength to define piety for the last time.
In his fourth attempt to define piety, Euthyphro declares that the godly and pious is the part of the just that is concerned with the care of the gods, while that concerned with the care of men is the remaining part of justice" (12e). The problem with this definition is that Euthyphro makes a circular argument. While coming up with his definition of piety, Euthyphro commits a logical fallacy—he presupposes that humans know the “care of the gods” (12e). As a result, when Socrates asks him to describe the purpose of piety, Euthyphro is forced to restate his third argument--he explains that "piety is what is loved by the gods" (14b). Consequently, the discussion has come full-circle. Socrates once again asks Euthyphro "What is piety?" and Euthyphro hastily abandons the conversation.