Drukman And Jacobs Summary

Drukman and Jacobs aim to explain what type of information politicians collect, and how it effects the way they make policy decisions. Where previous research focuses on the degree to which policymakers respond to public opinion, Drukman and Jacobs focus on the type. The authors provide a framework and verifiable test that identifies the use of two different types of presidential monitoring. First, politicians track information based on the public’s policy-specific preferences. This explanation follows the populist version of democracy in which policymakers are expected to be closely aligned in preference to their constituents. The other account argues that politicians follow trends in public support for government. By this account, presidents and other political figures follow the general “mood” of the country,
Their arguments are compelling, however, their sole analysis of Nixon’s use of presidential monitoring leaves room to confound Nixon’s presidential style, and the application on their theory on a macro level. They make note of this within their argument, but have little to offer on the possible implications resulting from a lack of generalizability. Their argument applies particularly well to Nixon as a president with a strong conservative base and an ability to win over swing-voters, yet there is much to be explained about voters with varied political styles. How would a more moderate president, with a smaller base and larger split-ticket policy, compare?
The article also fails to mention Watergate and its’ effect on presidential monitoring. Since Drukman and Jacob use Nixon as their sole explanation of theory, the event with the most public influence should be included in their analysis. What effect would Watergate have on public opinion and in turn the way the President monitored