Divine Omnipotence & Thomas Aquinas
Divine Omnipotence and Thomas Aquinas
In the evaluation of divine omnipotence, the natural assumption that God is capable of all things must be submitted to inquiry and close consideration. Although omnipotence is technically defined as all-encompassing, unlimited power, divine omnipotence is understood by many in a paradoxical way in the view that there are certain things that God, even as an ‘all-powerful being’, cannot do. In response to the argument that God is not omnipotent because he cannot falsify a necessary truth, Thomas Aquinas would argue that God’s power does not - and rationally should not be expected to - include things that are logically impossible. Under Aquinas’ assessment of the scope of omnipotence, the necessary truth argument is unsound because the statement ‘God cannot falsify a necessary truth’ is void by the definitional contradiction in falsifying a necessary truth.
Aquinas acknowledged the difficulty in defining and comprehending God’s power: “all confess that God is omnipotent…[but] it seems difficult to explain in what God’s omnipotence precisely consists” . However Aquinas eventually comes to assert that if something can be, then God can bring it about; His power extends to anything that does not involve a direct contradiction. For example, God cannot make a circle into a square. By definition, a circle is a geometric shape with no corners and a square is a geometric shape with four corners. Fundamentally, the states of being a square and a circle are mutually exclusive. Similarly, falsifying a necessary truth is impossible; it is a direct contradiction to what a necessary truth is by definition: something that cannot possibly be false. Therefore Aquinas’ response to the necessary truth argument would be that the argument is unsound on the basis that one cannot argue that God is not omnipotent because he is incapable of making the fundamentally impossible, possible.
To apply Aquinas’ perspective to the given argument
In the evaluation of divine omnipotence, the natural assumption that God is capable of all things must be submitted to inquiry and close consideration. Although omnipotence is technically defined as all-encompassing, unlimited power, divine omnipotence is understood by many in a paradoxical way in the view that there are certain things that God, even as an ‘all-powerful being’, cannot do. In response to the argument that God is not omnipotent because he cannot falsify a necessary truth, Thomas Aquinas would argue that God’s power does not - and rationally should not be expected to - include things that are logically impossible. Under Aquinas’ assessment of the scope of omnipotence, the necessary truth argument is unsound because the statement ‘God cannot falsify a necessary truth’ is void by the definitional contradiction in falsifying a necessary truth.
Aquinas acknowledged the difficulty in defining and comprehending God’s power: “all confess that God is omnipotent…[but] it seems difficult to explain in what God’s omnipotence precisely consists” . However Aquinas eventually comes to assert that if something can be, then God can bring it about; His power extends to anything that does not involve a direct contradiction. For example, God cannot make a circle into a square. By definition, a circle is a geometric shape with no corners and a square is a geometric shape with four corners. Fundamentally, the states of being a square and a circle are mutually exclusive. Similarly, falsifying a necessary truth is impossible; it is a direct contradiction to what a necessary truth is by definition: something that cannot possibly be false. Therefore Aquinas’ response to the necessary truth argument would be that the argument is unsound on the basis that one cannot argue that God is not omnipotent because he is incapable of making the fundamentally impossible, possible.
To apply Aquinas’ perspective to the given argument