Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?
Edward Bailey
Professor Saba Ozyurt PH.D
International Organizations IRL-6200
April 11 2012
Week 4 Summary 1A
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?
(Daniel Drezner) The article describes the complex international political structure on how the United States and other powerful nations declared sanctions on rival or rogue states. The articles main argue is that powerful states mostly will loss in the political arena when it comes to promoting a coalition of cooperating states to punish a nation it considers a rogue state The main questions of the article is how and why unilateral sanctions works much better than multilateral ones. To answer this question, the author breaks down his argument into three theoretical sub arguments, the bargaining between the Primary Sender (Main State) and the Target (Sanction State), bargaining between the Primacy Sender and the Secondary Senders (Secondary States) and the enforcement of multilateral co-operations.
The author argues that bargaining between the primary sender and the targeted state is very difficult if the two parties don’t come to a quick agreement. Mostly the targeted state will see which countries join the primary sender cause and try to create side deals with these states to keep exports inflow coming in to there country. Also the primary sender will try in bride the secondary senders so they won’t break rank to seek backdoor deals with the targeted state. For example the United States try to impose sanctions on the U.S.S.R. for it invasion of Afghanistan, but the sanction fail because of the secondary states sign a backdoor grain deal with the secondary state of Argentina which increase their profits over 25 %. The author also argues that multilateral cooperation’s don’t last due to two issues economic and normative ideologies. Some states will seek to withdraw due to over states and private actor heavily profiting from the sanctions and domestic
Professor Saba Ozyurt PH.D
International Organizations IRL-6200
April 11 2012
Week 4 Summary 1A
Bargaining, Enforcement, and Multilateral Sanctions: When Is Cooperation Counterproductive?
(Daniel Drezner) The article describes the complex international political structure on how the United States and other powerful nations declared sanctions on rival or rogue states. The articles main argue is that powerful states mostly will loss in the political arena when it comes to promoting a coalition of cooperating states to punish a nation it considers a rogue state The main questions of the article is how and why unilateral sanctions works much better than multilateral ones. To answer this question, the author breaks down his argument into three theoretical sub arguments, the bargaining between the Primary Sender (Main State) and the Target (Sanction State), bargaining between the Primacy Sender and the Secondary Senders (Secondary States) and the enforcement of multilateral co-operations.
The author argues that bargaining between the primary sender and the targeted state is very difficult if the two parties don’t come to a quick agreement. Mostly the targeted state will see which countries join the primary sender cause and try to create side deals with these states to keep exports inflow coming in to there country. Also the primary sender will try in bride the secondary senders so they won’t break rank to seek backdoor deals with the targeted state. For example the United States try to impose sanctions on the U.S.S.R. for it invasion of Afghanistan, but the sanction fail because of the secondary states sign a backdoor grain deal with the secondary state of Argentina which increase their profits over 25 %. The author also argues that multilateral cooperation’s don’t last due to two issues economic and normative ideologies. Some states will seek to withdraw due to over states and private actor heavily profiting from the sanctions and domestic