An Essay on Clinical Negligence
An Essay on Clinical Negligence “We have always thought of causation as a logical, almost mathematical business. To intrude policy into causation is like saying that two plus two does not equal to four because, for policy reasons, it should not.” (Charles Foster NLJ 5/11/2004 page 1644).
To what extent do you consider that Charles Foster is correct in that causation and clinical negligence should be a “mathematical business” and the courts have, by introducing matters of policy, confused what should be a logical approach?
Introduction:
In the article of “It should be, therefore it is”1, its author, Charles Foster examined the surprise House of Lords judgment in Chester v Afshar2, what he described as “an exercise in legal creativity that abolishes the requirement for causation in any meaningful sense.”
To discuss the above issue, one must consider the legal requirements of clinical negligence.
In order for a patient to succeed in a claim for clinical negligence against his doctor, he must be able to satisfy three requirements: first, he must establish that a duty of care was owed by the doctor or hospital to himself; second, he must prove that the doctor has breached that duty of care by failing to reach the standard of care required by the law; lastly, the patient must prove that his injury was caused by the doctor’s negligent act. Each of these requirements for negligence will be considered as the strict requirements for a successful claim of the patient suffering from an adverse event in a medical context. These steps were referred by Charles Foster as the logical “mathematical business” 3towards establishing the causation in a clinical negligence case.
Is Chester’s case a relaxation of the causation requirements?
To discuss this statement, one must consider whether the breach of duty causes the harm to the patient. Even if a doctor breaches his duty of care by falling below the standard of care, a patient can only
To what extent do you consider that Charles Foster is correct in that causation and clinical negligence should be a “mathematical business” and the courts have, by introducing matters of policy, confused what should be a logical approach?
Introduction:
In the article of “It should be, therefore it is”1, its author, Charles Foster examined the surprise House of Lords judgment in Chester v Afshar2, what he described as “an exercise in legal creativity that abolishes the requirement for causation in any meaningful sense.”
To discuss the above issue, one must consider the legal requirements of clinical negligence.
In order for a patient to succeed in a claim for clinical negligence against his doctor, he must be able to satisfy three requirements: first, he must establish that a duty of care was owed by the doctor or hospital to himself; second, he must prove that the doctor has breached that duty of care by failing to reach the standard of care required by the law; lastly, the patient must prove that his injury was caused by the doctor’s negligent act. Each of these requirements for negligence will be considered as the strict requirements for a successful claim of the patient suffering from an adverse event in a medical context. These steps were referred by Charles Foster as the logical “mathematical business” 3towards establishing the causation in a clinical negligence case.
Is Chester’s case a relaxation of the causation requirements?
To discuss this statement, one must consider whether the breach of duty causes the harm to the patient. Even if a doctor breaches his duty of care by falling below the standard of care, a patient can only